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Obamacare Interrupted:
Obstructive Federalism and the Consumer
Information Blockade
KATHERINE T. VUKADIN†
I deem [one of] the essential principles of our
Government . . . the diffusion of information.1
INTRODUCTION
The Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)2 aims to deliver costeffective health insurance to Americans while decreasing the
cost of care and improving outcomes. These aspirations mean
little, however, unless accurate information about the ACA
reaches its key stakeholders: consumers.
The ACA allows the states to embrace or reject some of
the law’s most significant tenets; one widely-criticized
rejection is the southern states’ refusal to expand Medicaid.
Less well known and little criticized, however, is the quiet
† Associate Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of Law at Texas
Southern University. J.D., The University of Texas School of Law, B.A.,
University of Houston. I thank the readers who gave their insights during the
discussion of this Article at the 2015 AALS meeting. Professor Sidney D. Watson
provided thoughtful comments, for which I am most grateful. I thank Davor
Vukadin and Anne Traverse for their constant support. Thurgood Marshall
School of Law generously provided a summer research grant for this Article.
1. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp.
2. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.), was signed into law on
March 23, 2010; the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.), was
signed into law on March 30, 2010. These two bills will be referred to as the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) or the Act in this Article, and, for the ease of the
reader, all citations will be to the final ACA bill if possible.
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rejection of a second, equally significant underpinning of the
ACA: informational transparency for consumers. The ACA
contains a network of provisions designed to revolutionize
health insurance by permitting previously-unknown
information to flow freely. Provision after provision of the
ACA reflects a deep-seated faith in the role of information
dissemination and collection, which permits informed
consumer choices and targeted enforcement of consumer
protections. The states can, however, opt out of many
consumer information provisions. At the same time, the
states cannot opt out of the federally-implemented individual
and employer mandates and the associated penalties; these
penalties remain a constant, applying equally to every
American regardless of state recalcitrance.
This Article posits that the states rejecting the ACA’s
consumer information provisions are thereby relegating their
citizens to a second-class ACA status, in which the ACA’s
penalties apply but the benefits remain elusive. Under those
states’ obstructive federalism approach, their citizens remain
subject to the ACA’s federal costs and penalties but their
access to health insurance is threatened by lack of
information. While some of the provisions have a federal
fallback, the federal government is ill-equipped to take on the
full burden of implementation, and federal intrusion is
particularly unwelcome in these states. So that the ACA’s
benefits are more consistently available to Americans of
every state, citizens and policy-makers in recalcitrant states
should advocate for informational transparency and full
information for consumers, just as stakeholders are pushing
for the Medicaid expansion in those states. While a federal
fallback exists for some aspects of the ACA, the effective
provision of consumer information requires state
participation and should not be ceded to the federal
government.
Part I summarizes the ACA’s goals and the informational
transparency provisions designed to help accomplish the
goals; Part II explains certain states’ obstructive federalism
and how these states are ignoring or undermining the ACA’s
transparency provisions; and Part III describes the perverse,
secondary results of this rejection and possible means of
ameliorating these outcomes.
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I. THE ACA’S GOALS AND INFORMATIONAL TRANSPARENCY
The ACA aims to increase health insurance enrollment
and improve healthcare costs and outcomes. Controversial
from the start, the law’s passage required a cooperative
federalism approach,3 by which the federal government and
the states would each have significant roles. Alongside this
commitment to cooperative federalism, the ACA reflects its
drafters’ belief in the power of informational transparency to
accomplish a variety of health insurance and healthcare
goals. The ACA’s success depends on cooperative federalism
and the free flow of information.
A. A Foundation in Informational Transparency
The ACA employs informational transparency to
accomplish goals extending from improved access to
affordable health insurance to better public health through
disclosure of nutritional information. Provision after
provision calls for the gathering, disclosure, or exchange of
information. This emphasis on informational transparency
stems from the ACA’s drafters’ faith in the power of
information’s free flow to bring about health reform.4 The
drafters envisioned informational transparency operating at
3. See infra Part II.A.
4. Bending the curve of healthcare costs and enhancing information sharing
“will first require the administration and private parties to work together to
exchange real-time information to support care and also to enable better
measurement of cost and quality of care at the individual-level, empowering
specific clinical transformation efforts.” Joseph Antos, et al., Bending the Curve
Through Health Reform Implementation, 16 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 804, 808
(2010). ACA architect Ezekiel Emanuel, M.D., Ph.D., referred to transparency as
an “imperative,” so that patients can learn about the cost of healthcare services
and the quality of the providers before undergoing treatment. Robert P. Kocher
& Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Transparency Imperative, 159 ANNALS INT’L MED. 296,
296 (2013) (“All data on price, utilization, and quality of health care should be
made available to the public unless there is a compelling reason not to do so.”). At
present, patients have tremendous difficulty finding out the price of a procedure
in advance—“obtaining such information is almost impossible.” Id. In addition,
Kocher and Emanuel argue that to make an informed decision about whether and
with whom to have a procedure, patients need to know how many such procedures
a potential provider has performed. Id. (“Physician case volume is one of the most
important predictors of quality for many surgeries and medical conditions.”).

424

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

numerous levels; the ACA reflects this vision, with
transparency of information for healthcare prices,5 health
insurance value information, and insurance price increase
information.6 And, where relationships and the exchange of
money and gifts can influence decision-making, those
relationships and exchanges should be disclosed.7
But informational transparency in the ACA is much
broader than that. As described below, the ACA includes
transparency provisions designed to connect consumers with
their benefits, enforcement officials with appropriate targets,
and the public with information about health insurance
pricing practices.
B. How Informational Transparency Accomplishes the
ACA’s Main Goals
Informational transparency provisions help consumers
access the information necessary to claim their rights, while
other provisions call for the disclosure of information to shed
light on less desirable practices and relationships. While
some of the informational transparency provisions operate
without state assistance, others count the state governments
as first-line implementers.

5. Ezekiel J. Emanuel, In Health Care, Choice Is Overrated, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/opinion/in-health-care-choice-isoverrated.html?_r=0 (“[W]e need more transparency. Insurance companies
should have to publish the measures they use to select their ‘high performing’ or
‘efficient’ networks. This will discourage them from looking at price alone.”);
Ezekiel Emanuel et al., A Systemic Approach to Containing Healthcare Spending,
367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 949 (2012).
6. Early in the health care reform discussions, ACA architect and Senate
Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus (D-Mont.) argued that transparency
should a key part of the proposed law. SEN. MAX BAUCUS, CALL TO ACTION: HEALTH
REFORM 2009 69-70 (2008), available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/download/
?id=916b0ea3-96dc-4c7a-bb35-241fa822367e. He envisioned transparency
extending to the price of health insurance, including employer plans, and outcome
information. See id. at 65.
7. Id. at 70.
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1. Affordable, Available Health Insurance Through
Exchanges, Outreach, and Education
The ACA aims to make high-quality, affordable health
insurance more available and to bring immediate
improvements to all health care coverage.8 With the full
Medicaid expansion as originally planned, the ACA would
have covered thirty-two million of the previously-uninsured,9
8. See ACA Title I. As enacted and if fully implemented, the ACA would have
covered 32 million of the 50 million Americans without health insurance.
J. Angelo DeSantis & Gabriel Ravel, The Consequence of Repealing Health Care
Reform in Early 2013, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 365, 376 (2012). Of those left without
insurance, 19 million would be non-elderly adults, as follows:
Thirty-seven percent—mostly young singles without dependents—would
be eligible for Medicaid, but not enrolled; Twenty-five percent would be
undocumented immigrants; Sixteen percent would be exempt from the
individual mandate because they would not have an affordable insurance
option; Eight percent would be eligible for affordable subsidized coverage
in the health benefit exchanges; The remaining 15 percent—most higherincome families with dependents—would likely be subject to the
mandate, having an affordable private insurance option despite not
qualifying for a subsidy.
MATTHEW BUETTGENS & MARK A. HALL, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., WHO
WILL BE UNINSURED AFTER HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM? (2011), available at
http://www.rwjf.org/en/research-publications/find-rwjf-research/2011/03/whowill-be-uninsured-after-health-insurance-reform-.html. In 2010, about 16.3% of
the U.S. population, or 49.9 million people, had no health insurance coverage.
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., ASPE ISSUE BRIEF: OVERVIEW OF THE UNINSURED IN THE UNITED
STATES: A SUMMARY OF THE 2011 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 1-2 (2011),
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2011/CPSHealthIns2011/ib.pdf.
9. JOHN E. MCDONOUGH, INSIDE NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM 109-10 (Univ. of
Cal. Press 2011). The ACA was never intended to provide universal coverage;
even if fully implemented, the ACA would leave millions uninsured. Mark A. Hall,
Evaluating the Affordable Care Act: The Eye of the Beholder, 51 HOU. L. REV. 1029,
1033 (2014) (citing Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office,
to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 20, 2010),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/amendreconprop.pdf). The
letter provides Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) and Joint Committee on
Taxation (“JCT”) estimates that by 2019, the combined effect of enacting H.R.
3590 and the reconciliation proposal would be “to reduce the number of nonelderly
people who are uninsured by about 32 million, leaving about 23 million nonelderly
residents uninsured (about one-third of whom would be unauthorized
immigrants). Under the legislation, the share of legal nonelderly residents with
insurance coverage would rise from about 83 percent currently to about 94
percent.” Elmendorf, supra, at 9.
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while bringing down the cost of both health insurance and
health care itself.10 The ACA uses a multi-pronged approach
to accomplish these goals, relying on mechanisms enacted
directly as part of the ACA as well as indirect mechanisms,
enacted as part of the ACA but then implemented through
financial incentives to the states. One principal strategy for
making health insurance more affordable is the ACA’s direct
financial support to lower income Americans. The ACA
provides premium reductions11 and also cost sharing
subsidies,12 available at income levels of up to 400% of the
federal poverty level.13 So that lower income Americans are
more able to afford health insurance, the ACA provides
payments directly to insurers.14 Premium subsidies provide a
tax credit for lower-income Americans who purchase health

10. See MCDONOUGH, supra note 9, at 109-10, 176-77.
11. Individuals are eligible for the premium tax credits if:
(1) they are not eligible for employer-provided coverage or for a public
health insurance program; (2) they are US citizens or lawful residents of
the United States; (3) they are not incarcerated; and (4) their modified
AGI is 100-400 percent of poverty (about $11,500-$46,000 for an
individual and $23,000-$94,000 for a family of four in 2013). Lawfully
present immigrants with incomes below 100 percent of poverty are also
eligible if they do not qualify for Medicaid because of immigration status
(for example, if they arrived in the United States during the past five
years). To be eligible, individuals must file a federal tax return in 2015
(a joint return if married) and not be claimed as a dependent on anyone
else’s return. The premium tax credit can be used to purchase coverage
for all people claimed as dependents on the tax return.
Julia James, Health Policy Brief: Premium Tax Credits, HEALTH AFFAIRS, 2-3
(Aug.
1,
2013)
[hereinafter
James,
Premium
Tax
Credits],
http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=97.
12. Out-of-pocket costs are subsidized for lower-income families. If a family of
four earns between 100 and 150% of the federal poverty level, the family is
responsible for paying 6% of covered expenses out-of-pocket, as compared with
the 30% that a non-subsidized family would pay. If the family earns more—
between 200 and 250% of poverty—then out-of-pocket spending is capped at
$2,250 for individuals and $4,500 for family coverage, as opposed to the $6,350,
for individuals, or $12,700, for families, for non-subsidized coverage. ACA §§
1401-02.
13. Id. § 1401 (codified at I.R.C § 36B (2012)); § 1402(b)(2).
14. Id. § 1402(c)(3)(A).
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insurance, and cost sharing subsidies limit the amounts that
lower income Americans pay out of pocket for health care.15
Several provisions ensure that consumers receive good
value when they purchase health insurance. To be considered
a “qualified health plan,” meaning a plan that can be offered
on an exchange, a health plan must include certain minimum
coverage provisions.16 And, through new medical loss ratio
rules, an insurer must refund premium dollars to insured
persons if the company spends less than 85 or 80% of
premiums on medical-related expenses—in addition,
companies must report their medical loss ratio to the
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and to
the public.17 The ACA also makes health insurance more
available by ensuring that Americans are not refused health
insurance due to pre-existing conditions and that prices are
not increased on the basis of gender or on any other basis
except those specified.18 In addition, health insurance issuers
must accept all individuals and employers who apply. 19
Young adults can remain covered on a parent’s health
insurance until age twenty-six.20
Transparency and consumer outreach are important
means of accomplishing these goals. Consumer outreach
15. See id. § 1402; see also MCDONOUGH, supra note 9, at 124 (“Premium
subsidies are needed so that the cost of purchasing health insurance does not take
too much out of a family’s household budget. It’s not good enough, though, to
reduce premiums to an affordable level if the coverage requires co-payments,
deductibles, or co-insurance that prevents individuals and families from
obtaining necessary medical care.”).
16. The services required to be covered include ambulatory patient services,
emergency services, hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, mental health
and substance abuse services including behavioral health treatment, prescription
drugs, rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices, laboratory services,
preventative and wellness services and chronic disease management, pediatric
services, including oral and vision care. ACA § 1302.
17. Id. § 2718.
18. See id. § 2701(a)(1) (stating that insurers may not discriminate on the basis
of gender and describing other bases for price differences).
19. See id. § 2702(a) (stating that “each health insurance issuer that offers
health insurance coverage in the individual or group market in a State must
accept every employer and individual in the State that applies for such coverage”).
20. Id. § 2714(a).
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begins with a centralized place to shop and compare plans:
the health insurance exchanges.21 The exchanges aim to drive
down health insurance prices by allowing consumers to
review relevant prices information and comparison shop in a
centralized market for health insurance policies.22 Not only
can consumers compare prices, but they can learn the total
premium revenue spent on nonclinical costs, so that they can
judge which policy provides better value.23
States are invited to set up their own exchanges,
potentially adding in their own transparency requirements
and promoting their exchanges on their own websites.
California has done just that, requiring price transparency
measures as a condition of joining the exchange.24
The
federally-facilitated
exchange
(“FFE”)
at
healthcare.gov discloses information regarding available
plans, rate premium information, and summary information
about covered benefits and cost sharing, together with other
useful information.25 Enforcement of these provisions is
21. See id. § 1321; Joshua Phares Ackerman, The Unintended Federalism
Consequences of the Affordable Care Act’s Insurance Market Reforms, 34 PACE L.
REV. 273, 273 (2014) (noting that the federal government operates an exchange
in any state without one).
22. ACA § 1103; Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the
Lack of Transparency in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 394,
434 (2014) (noting that transparency provisions of the ACA will allow consumers
to comparison shop for plans based on factors such as quality, access, and
premiums).
23. ACA § 1103(b). Health plans are required to adopt certain standards for
their transactions to keep administration as simple as possible. See id. § 1104.
The exchange rules require health insurers offering group or individual health
insurance coverage to account for their costs on an annual basis, by disclosing the
amount spent on reimbursement for clinical services provided, on activities that
improve health care, and on “all other non-claim costs.” Id. § 2718(a).
24. See COVERED CAL., DRAFT HEALTH PLAN CONTRACT 11-12 (2013), available
at http://hbex.coveredca.com/solicitations/QHP/library/Clean%20version%20v4%
20QHP%20Model%20Contract.pdf.
25. How
to
Choose
Marketplace
Insurance,
HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/choose-a-plan (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). The
website will also offer information such as the percentage of policies rescinded,
the percentage of claims denied, and the number and disposition of appealed and
denied claims. Karen Pollitz & Larry Levitt, Health Insurance Transparency
Under the Affordable Care Act, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Mar.
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planned to be a cooperative process involving compliance
assistance and cooperation with the states.26
The exchanges’ existence, however, does not guarantee
success if consumers stay away. To succeed, the ACA
requires uptake and enrollment, which in turn requires that
consumers know about as well as understand their choices
and rights. Many consumers, however, know little about the
ACA, and a significant number even believe it has been
repealed.27 Individuals can only enroll in the health
insurance through the ACA if they know that the opportunity
exists. Additional ACA provisions therefore aim to make
available the information that consumers need to obtain
coverage and make informed decisions.
One of the ACA’s means of disseminating information is
through direct outreach. The ACA, together with subsequent
regulations, provides for a number of individuals who can
inform consumers about health insurance options under the
ACA, assist with enrollment, and help potential enrollees
determine any applicable subsidies. These assistance roles
are subject to state or federal oversight through training,

8, 2012), http://kff.org/health-reform/perspective/health-insurance-transparencyunder-the-affordable-care-act; see ACA § 1311(e).
26. The departments intend to work cooperatively with the states in
enforcement; their approach is to work “together with employers, issuers, States,
providers and other stakeholders to help them come into compliance with the new
law and [to work] with families and individuals to help them understand the new
law and benefit from it, as intended. Compliance assistance is a high priority for
the Departments.” Affordable Care Act Implementation FAQs-Set 14, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/FactSheets-and-FAQs/aca_implementation_faqs14.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).
27. According to one poll, only fifty-nine percent of people overall knew that
the ACA was the law of the land and would be implemented, while the rest were
not sure. Phil Galewitz, 10 States Are Critical to Administration’s Efforts to Enroll
6 Million in New Health Plans, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 19, 2014)
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2014/March/19/10-states-are-criticalto-administrations-efforts-to-enroll-6-million-in-new-health-plans.aspx; Kaiser
Health Tracking Poll April 2013, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 30,
2013) [hereinafter Kaiser Health Tracking Poll April 2013], http://kff.org/healthreform/poll-finding/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-april-2013.
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certification, and approval, and then through ongoing
oversight.28
Certified Application Counselors. Exchanges are
required to have a certified application counselor program,
which is developed by designating organizations to certify
counselors or by directly certifying counselors or members of
other organizations.29 Certified application counselors are
assistance personnel available to give information to
consumers and help them enroll in qualified health plans and
insurance affordability programs.30 Counselors’ duties and
obligations—as well as the standards for certifying
counselors—are regulated.31 To be designated as part of the
certified application counselor program, an organization
must have experience providing social services to the
community, must engage in services that position them to
help those they serve with health coverage issues, and have
processes in place that screen their staff members and
volunteers so as to protect personally identifiable
information.32 To be designated, organizations must first
apply to the federally-facilitated marketplace.33 The
exchange both oversees counselors and creates a procedure
to retract certification if a counselor violates the rules.34
Navigators. In addition, an exchange must create a
navigator program.35 Navigators are trained to provide free
28. See 45 C.F.R. § 155.225 (2014); see generally St. Louis Effort for AIDS v.
Huff, 996 F. Supp. 2d 798 (W.D. Mo. 2014).
29. 45 C.F.R. § 155.225(a)–(b)(2).
30. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., GUIDANCE ON CERTIFIED
APPLICATION COUNSELOR PROGRAM FOR THE FEDERALLY-FACILITATED
MARKETPLACE INCLUDING STATE PARTNERSHIP MARKETPLACES (2013) [hereinafter
CMS, CERTIFIED APPLICATION COUNSELORS], available at http://www.cms.gov/
CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/CAC-guidance-7-122013.pdf.
31. 45 C.F.R. § 155.225(d).
32. CMS, CERTIFIED APPLICATION COUNSELORS, supra note 30, at 2.
33. Id. at 2-3.
34. 45 C.F.R. § 155.225(e).
35. ACA § 1311(d)(4)(k); 45 C.F.R. § 155.210(a) (stating that an exchange
“must establish a [federal] Navigator program . . . through which it awards grants
to eligible public or private entities or individuals.”).
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information about health coverage options to consumers,
small businesses, and their employees.36 They are funded
through federal and state grants.37 Through these programs
and personnel, potential enrollees can learn about their
options on the exchanges, find out about any available
subsidies, and receive help with the actual application
process.
Non-Navigator Personnel. Personnel from states with
successful outreach programs emphasize the need for
outreach and contact on a personal, one-to-one basis,38 with
outreach personnel reaching potential enrollees where they
are. This means that navigators and other outreach
personnel can most effectively reach potential enrollees not
by staying in their offices, but by providing information at
sports events, schools, community health centers, grocery
stores, and places of leisure.39
Consumer information provisions are therefore a crucial
part of the ACA’s fundamental goal of increasing the number
of Americans with health insurance.

36. Navigator,
HEALTHCARE.GOV,
navigator (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).

https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/

37. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ASSISTANCE ROLES TO HELP CONSUMERS
APPLY & ENROLL IN HEALTH COVERAGE THROUGH THE MARKETPLACE (2013),
available at http://www.cms.gov/cciio/resources/files/downloads/marketplaceways-to-help.pdf (“Navigators will have a vital role in helping consumers prepare
electronic and paper applications to establish eligibility and enroll in coverage
through the Marketplace.”).
38. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PREPARING FOR OUTREACH AND
ENROLLMENT UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: LESSONS FROM THE STATES 17
(2013), available at https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/
092413_kff_outreach_transcript.pdf (“[W]hile marketing campaigns will help
educate individuals and raise awareness, enrollment efforts will really be driven
at the local level through on-the-ground work. . . .”).
39. See id. at 18-19 (statement of Kathleen Westcoat, HealthCare Access
Maryland, noting that the state has developed partnerships with grocery stores,
has bought advertising time during popular sports events, and will send
personnel to drug stores and other gathering places).
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2. Market Reforms and Stronger Consumer
Protections
The transparency and consumer information aspects of
the ACA permit the ACA’s market reforms to function and be
enforced. These reforms included the ACA’s prohibition on
some of the most damaging insurance practices—the barring
of individuals with pre-existing conditions40 and the
elimination of lifetime caps on coverage.41 Rescission, the
practice of cancelling insurance due to an application error
after a person files a claim, is also prohibited.42
The ACA also includes new appeal requirements for both
internal and external review of claim denials, so that
consumers can more effectively challenge an insurance
company.43 Additional patient protections include a choice of
primary care providers and required coverage of emergency
services, pediatric, and obstetrical and gynecological care.44
Consumer information is crucial for protection of
consumers in financial regulation, particularly insurance,45
so that consumers and those who wish to act on their behalf
can advocate based on full information.46 To disseminate
information, the ACA makes grants available to create state
offices of health insurance consumer assistance and
ombudsman programs.47 Even before the ACA, consumer
40. ACA § 2704.
41. Id. § 2711.
42. Id. § 2712.
43. Id. § 2719.
44. Id. § 2713(a).
45. See Schwarcz, supra note 22, at 394.
46. See id. (“Broadly construed, transparency involves making relevant
information available to consumers as well as others who might act on their
behalf, such as academics, journalists, newspapers, consumer organizations, or
other market watchdogs.”).
47. The ACA’s consumer assistance portion provides:
Health Insurance Consumer Information
(a) In General—The Secretary shall award grants to States to enable
such States (or the Exchanges operating in such States) to establish,
expand, or provide support for—
(1) offices of health insurance consumer assistance; or
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assistance programs run by the states performed a number
of different consumer assistance functions, from education to
advocacy in the claims process.48 To establish or expand these
programs under the ACA, the states can apply for grants
from the federal government; the offices and ombudsmen
then disseminate information regarding available health
insurance options, educate consumers regarding their rights,
and assist consumers with the complex health claim appeal
(2) health insurance ombudsman programs.
(b) Eligibility
(1) In general—To be eligible to receive a grant, a State shall designate
an independent office of health insurance consumer assistance, or an
ombudsman, that, directly or in coordination with State health insurance
regulators and consumer assistance organizations, receives and
responds to inquiries and complaints concerning health insurance
coverage with respect to Federal health insurance requirements and
under State law.
(2) Criteria—A State that receives a grant under this section shall
comply with criteria established by the Secretary for carrying out
activities under such grant.
(c) Duties—The office of health insurance consumer assistance or health
insurance ombudsman shall—
(1) assist with the filing of complaints and appeals, including filing
appeals with the internal appeal or grievance process of the group health
plan or health insurance issuer involved and providing information
about the external appeal process;
(2) collect, track, and quantify problems and inquiries encountered by
consumers;
(3) educate consumers on their rights and responsibilities with respect
to group health plans and health insurance coverage;
(4) assist consumers with enrollment in a group health plan or health
insurance coverage by providing information, referral, and assistance;
and
(5) resolve problems with obtaining premium tax credits under section
36B of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
ACA § 2793(a)–(c).
48. CARRIE TRACY ET AL., MAKING HEALTH REFORM WORK: STATE CONSUMER
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y 1-7 (2010), available at
http://www.communityhealthadvocates.org/sites/communityhealthadvocates.org/
files/publications/2010/Making_Health_Reform_Work_State_Consumer_Assista
nce_Programs.pdf. A program in Connecticut, for example, advocated directly for
consumers statewide, employing nine staff members and closing 2613 complaints
in 2009. Id. at 18.
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process.49 But in addition to disseminating information,
consumer assistance programs are meant to serve a
“sentinel” role.50 That is, the ombudsmen and offices also
collect information on the type and number of problems that
consumers are experiencing.51 Indeed, the grants are
conditioned upon the collection of such information.52 This
information would in turn be used to determine the need for
enforcement actions at the state and federal levels.
Consumer assistance programs can perform this sentinel role
most effectively when they remain independent yet maintain
avenues for providing feedback to enforcement agencies and
policy makers.53
49. See id. at 3-7.
50. Id. at 7. A consumer assistance program can alert state officials to patterns
of non-compliance. Id. As an example, in 2008, a Massachusetts citizens
assistance program determined from the calls it received that some consumers
were not being sent proper recertification documents; the program alerted state
officials, who were able to resolve the problem and prevent consumers from losing
their insurance. Id.; Rachel Grob et al, The Affordable Care Act’s Plan for
Consumer Assistance With Insurance Moves States Forward But Remains a Work
in Progress, 32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 347, 354 (2013) (noting that “[c]onsumer
assistance was envisioned under health reform both as a form of patient
protection unto itself—universal access to broadly defined assistance—and as a
mechanism for promoting robust implementation of new and existing insurance
regulations.”).
51. Consumer assistance or ombudsman programs
shall be required to collect and report data to the Secretary on the types
of problems and inquiries encountered by consumers. The Secretary
shall utilize such data to identify areas where more enforcement action
is necessary and shall share such information with State insurance
regulators, the Secretary of Labor, and the Secretary of the Treasury for
use in the enforcement activities of such agencies.
ACA § 2793(d).
52. Id.
53. One study of consumer assistance groups recommended that to be effective,
consumer assistance programs should be independent of—but have strong
feedback to—regulatory agencies, should serve consumers with all types of
coverage, should be based in the communities they serve and have cultural
competence and multiple language capacity, should employ trained professional
staff, should use online tools, and should have a sustainable funding source.
Programs with these characteristics can work with agencies and officials to
ensure that enforcement efforts are more effectively directed. TRACY ET AL., supra
note 48, at 22-23.
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The states’ department of insurance websites can also be
helpful in advising consumers of their rights. Within a few
clicks from its home page, for example, the California
Department of Insurance website explains the market
reforms that are already in effect and those that are soon to
be implemented.54
Informational transparency thus ensures that
consumers have the information they need to learn their
rights, while consumer assistance programs collect necessary
data for tailored enforcement of consumer protections.
3. Lower Costs and Better Quality in Healthcare
Through Information Collection and Dissemination
The ACA aims not simply to lower the cost of health
insurance but to lower the cost of healthcare itself. The ACA
takes aim at both the high cost of American health care and
opacity in health care quality. One means of addressing
quality and outcomes is to require the gathering and
dissemination of information that will shed light on these
issues.55 The ACA makes pricing information more available
through a provision proposed by the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services.56 The ACA contains provisions that
will allow consumers to compare providers’ quality, such as

54. The Affordable Care Act, CAL. DEP’T OF INS., http://www.insurance.ca.gov/
01-consumers/110-health/10-basics/aca.cfm (last visited Mar. 17, 2015)
(explaining reforms such as the prohibition on rescission, the guarantee of issue
despite pre-existing conditions, and others).
55. ACA § 2717(a)(1) (requiring the development of “reporting requirements
for use by a group health plan, and a health insurance issuer offering group or
individual health insurance coverage, with respect to plan or coverage benefits
and health care provider reimbursement structures that—(A) improve health
outcomes through the implementation of activities such as quality reporting,
effective case management, care coordination, chronic disease management, and
medication and care compliance initiatives.”).
56. The requirement can be fulfilled by releasing pricing information after an
inquiry. Fiscal Year 2015 Proposed Policy and Payment Changes for Inpatient
Stays in Acute-Care Hospitals and Long-Term Care Hospitals, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/
MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2014-Fact-sheets-items/2014-04-30.html.
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the dissemination of Comparative Effectiveness Research. 57
This provision requires the collection and dissemination of
information about outcomes, risks, and clinical effectiveness
of various treatments and services.58 The information must
be useful and consumer-friendly to enable better decisionmaking.59 This newly-available information will be used to
determine and assign quality ratings and to measure and
assess quality improvements.60 Other measures include
administrative simplification61 and cost-saving changes to
Medicare.62
Relationships and exchanges of gifts can influence
decision-makers, so the ACA sheds light on these too. The
Physician Payment Sunshine provision requires disclosure of
gifts worth as little as $10 to physicians from pharmaceutical
companies.63 Practitioners are already anticipating that this
provision will result in greater scrutiny and increased
enforcement actions.64 The ACA also contains reporting and
57. Some commentators believe this provision is an exception to the ACA’s
overall top-down approach, which regulates at the supply side rather than
allowing meaningful consumer participation. Marshall B. Kapp, Health Reform
and the Affordable Care Act: Not Really Trusting the Consumer, 42 STET. L. REV.
9, 11-18 (2012).
58. Consumers are the intended audience for this information—the
information is to be disseminated in a fashion that is “comprehensible and
useful . . . in making . . . decisions.” ACA § 6301(d)(8)(A)(i).
59. Id.
60. Ledia M. Tabor et al., Measuring Quality in the Early Years of Health
Insurance Exchanges, 19 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 220 (2013).
61. As much as twenty-four percent of U.S. healthcare spending goes to
paperwork and bureaucracy. MCDONOUGH, supra note 9, at 137. The ACA
attempts to lower this number by requiring that HHS create new, uniform
standards and operating rules, as well as health insurers’ compliance with the
rules. Id. at 138. Financial penalties are to be levied for non-compliance. Id.
62. ACA Title III passim. Title III contains approximately $449 billion in
savings, through rate reductions and system improvements. MCDONOUGH, supra
note 9, at 156.
63. See ACA § 6002.
64. It seems likely that the increased transparency contemplated by the
ACA will result in an increase in enforcement actions under existing fraud and
abuse (kickback) laws, and attorneys representing the industry, as well as those
advising physicians, teaching hospitals, and other providers, need to be far more
attentive to such concerns than they may have been in the past. Paul DeStefano,
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transparency provisions with regard to physician ownership
of hospitals and nursing homes.65 The ACA requires collection
of information on race, ethnicity, sex, primary language, and
disability status to make this information available to
researchers and to work toward reducing disparities.66
The ACA also means transparency and movement of
information at the physician/patient level, with the
requirement that physicians switch to electronic records.67 In
brief, movement of information occurs at multiple levels and
across practically every relationship in healthcare, so that
consumers have the information they need to judge price,
quality, and even biased decision-making in their healthcare.
4. A New Focus on Prevention
Title IV of the ACA puts in place a national strategy
toward disease prevention and early detection. The ACA
increases access to preventative services through Medicare
by requiring Medicare coverage of wellness and preventive
services,68 and also through private insurance by requiring
coverage
of
preventative
health
services
and
immunizations.69 Transparency matters to these provisions
Key Legal Issues and Challenges Facing the Life Sciences Industry, in
UNDERSTANDING LEGAL TRENDS IN THE LIFE SCIENCES INDUSTRY 39 (THOMSON
REUTERS/ASPATORE 2014).
65. See ACA § 6002.
66. Effective March 23, 2012, the ACA requires the collection and reporting of
certain “data on race, ethnicity, sex, primary language, and disability
status.” ACA § 4302. The data collection and disaggregation “will help address
and reduce disparities faced by communities including lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgender (LGBT) Americans.” The Second Anniversary of Health Care Reform
is Good News, Will There be a Third?, CTR. FOR MEDICARE ADVOCACY,
http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/the-second-anniversary-of-health-care-reformis-good-news-will-there-be-a-third (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). This information
is to be made publicly available and is to be provided to various offices and
institutions. Id. Within four years after the ACA’s enactment, the Secretary is to
report to Congress and recommend improved means for identifying disparities.
ACA § 1946(b)(2).
67. ACA § 1104.
68. ACA § 4103-05.
69. Id. § 2713.
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too, with requirements such as the inclusion of calorie counts
on restaurant menus.70
Thus, the ACA is steeped in informational transparency
provisions, particularly with regard to consumer access to
information about benefits, rights, and health insurance
company practices. The ACA’s basis in cooperative
federalism, however, means that the states are free to reject
some of the most significant informational transparency
provisions—and many states have chosen to do exactly that.
II. OBSTRUCTIVE FEDERALISM AND THE WAR ON

INFORMATIONAL TRANSPARENCY
The ACA’s consumer information transparency
provisions are vulnerable to state resistance and obstruction
because the consumer information provisions are designed to
include a significant role for state governments. As a whole,
the ACA sets out a variety of different combinations of state
and federal roles addressing health insurance coverage,
consumer protections, cost of care, and other issues. Some
provisions call for the federal government to act alone, others
leave actions entirely to the states, and some invite state
participation but retain a federal fallback if the states do not
act. The latter, a combined federal/state approach known as
“cooperative federalism,” allows the states to tailor programs
according to their citizens’ particular needs and desires. 71 In
the ACA’s case, however, cooperative federalism also allows
anti-ACA states to reject completely some portions of the
ACA, particularly those that would be most helpful to
consumers: those addressing communication with consumers
on the matter of coverage availability and options, rate
review, and consumer rights.
70. Section 4205 requires calorie labeling on chain restaurant menus, and
section 4101 provides $50 million in grants for school-based clinics serving
medically underserved families and children, for fiscal years 2010 through 2013.
71. See, e.g., Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right
to Health Care, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1325, 1338 (2010) (discussing cooperative
federalism and programs in which the state spent monies but also received
monies from the federal government). For a further discussion, see Susan RoseAckerman, Cooperative Federalism and Co-optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344 (1983)
(discussing approaches to cooperative federalism).
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A. Cooperative Federalism
The ACA’s basis in cooperative federalism arises out of
constitutional concerns, practical considerations, and
political necessity. Traditionally, the states dealt with
insurance regulation, leaving the federal government with
less experience in such matters.72 Other reasons make state
participation an appealing option—state governments are
closer to citizens’ concerns. Because the states are smaller
units of government, citizens are more likely to be able to
have their voices heard and recognized; the state government
can therefore be more responsive to its citizens than the
federal government can be.73 With regard to certain
programs, the states are able to carry out the federal
program’s goals effectively and connect more easily with
citizens. With regard to health care, proponents of a greater
state role have stressed local variation and the expertise of
state health personnel on the ground.74 And, with regard to
the states, numerous aspects of state constitutions provide
72. Richard A. Epstein & David A. Hyman, Fixing Obamacare: The Virtues of
Choice, Competition, and Deregulation, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 493, 511
(2013); Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation:
State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE
L.J. 534, 565-66 (2011) [hereinafter Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism] (noting
that “there are many other reasons that the federal government uses state
implementers . . . the value of policy experimentation, state autonomy, the
inability of uniform solutions to fit diverse localities, citizens’ greater ability to
participate in the local political process, the comparative strengths of the states
in certain areas of the law, and the fact that pockets of state control serve as
important checks on national authority.”). The states’ role in insurance matters
has been less sovereign in recent decades, however, with the federal government’s
encroachment on the states’ authority through programs such as Medicaid, the
State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) and others that function
through both state and federal participation. Kyle Thomson, State-Run Insurance
Exchanges in Federal Healthcare Reform: A Case Study in Dysfunctional
Federalism, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 548, 549 (2012) (citing PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982)).
73. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012) (noting
that “the facets of governing that touch on citizens’ daily lives are normally
administered by smaller governments closer to the governed”).
74. Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism From Federal Statutes: Health Reform,
Medicaid, and the Old-Fashioned Federalists’ Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749,
1751-52 (2013).
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the means to ensure that the states remain responsive to
their citizens.75
Politics also drove the ACA’s inclusion of state
preferences. As a practical matter, the ACA was more
palatable politically due to its status as a state/federal
program rather than a purely federal one.76 The Republicans
preferred from the outset a federally-financed but stateadministered approach, as opposed to a purely federal one.77
Indeed, without this structure, the ACA may not have passed
at all.78 With the ACA, the Republicans prevailed and
received their preferred structure.79
Cooperative federalism presents a delicate balance,
however, because the federal government’s power to control
the actions of state governments is limited. As the Supreme
Court reiterated in NFIB v. Sebelius,80 the federal
government cannot take control of state apparatuses to carry

75. James A. Gardner, Devolution and the Paradox of Democratic
Unresponsiveness, 40 S. TEX. L. R. 759, 765-68 (1999) (describing features of state
governments that make them more responsive to their citizens, such as
opportunity to elect lower-level officials, provisions for popular recall, term limits,
limits in taking on debt, and others).
76. See, e.g., MCDONOUGH, supra note 9, at 128.
77. Id.
78. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 72, at 578 (“Giving the states
the leadership role was the concession ultimately required to close the deal.”). In
the end, the cooperative federalism model was the only one that could pass, due
to the procedural posture of the bills after the loss of Democrats’ sixty-vote
majority in the senate following the Massachusetts special election. MCDONOUGH,
supra note 9, at 128. The House reform plan envisioned a single, federally-run
exchange, but in the reconciliation process, the Senate version prevailed. Id. But,
after Democrats lost their sixty-vote majority in the Senate following the
Massachusetts special election to replace the deceased Senator Kennedy, health
reform could only be passed via the reconciliation process, which required only
fifty-one votes for passage. Id. at 94. Under reconciliation, the only changes that
can be made are those that have a direct and substantial impact on the budget.
Id. at 97. The Senate parliamentarian had ruled that no changes could be made
to the Senate bill’s exchange structure, because those would not affect the budget.
Id. at 128. Therefore, the Senate version of the exchanges—which invited state
participation—stayed in the final bill. Id.
79. MCDONOUGH, supra note 9, at 128.
80. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012).
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out its goals81—the federal government possesses only
enumerated powers, not a “general authority to perform all
the
conceivable
functions
of
government.”82
The
constitutionality of any particular federal/state program
turns on the issue of choice—that is, does the state have a
“genuine choice” available to not follow the federal request?83
Using this analysis, the ACA’s offering of grants with
conditions attached did not violate the anti-commandeering
principle,84 but the mandatory Medicaid expansion did.85 In
the case of the Medicaid expansion, the Court ruled that
there was no such “genuine choice,” because the ACA
threatened to take away all of a recalcitrant state’s Medicaid
payments, which generally represent 20% of a state’s total
budget.86 In making this determination, the Court potentially
81. “Congress may not simply ‘conscript state [agencies] into the national
bureaucratic army.’” Id. at 2606-07 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
82. Id. at 2577.
83. See id. at 2607-08.
84. Id. at 2607 (“Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds
under the Affordable Care Act to expand the availability of health care, and
requiring that States accepting such funds comply with the conditions on their
use.”).
85. The Court illustrated its reasoning with the example of Congress’s tying of
highway funds to the states’ minimum drinking age. When Congress threatened
five percent of the states’ federal highway funds if they did not raise their
minimum drinking age to twenty-one years of age, the provision was permissible
because of the scale of the inducement: five percent of highway funds represented
less than half a percent of South Dakota’s budget at the time South Dakota
challenged the drinking age requirement. Id. at 2604. This, the Court explained,
was a “relatively mild encouragement.” Id. (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483
U.S. 203, 211 (1987))
86. Id. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion explained the ACA could permissibly
require the states to comply with the ACA’s conditions so as to qualify for the
funding associated with the Medicaid expansion. Id. at 2607. The impermissible
piece, however, was Congress’s requirement that the states either participate in
the “new program” of Medicaid expansion or lose their Medicaid funds completely,
including funds for Medicaid as it existed before the ACA. Id. The opinion
describes the expanded Medicaid as distinct from Medicaid pre-ACA. See id.
Threatening states with the loss of their existing Medicaid funding streams—
funds constituting, on average, more than twenty percent of a state’s annual
budget—“is much more than ‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the
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altered the anti-commandeering doctrine, with significant
implications for numerous programs.87
The ACA contains a variety of different combinations of
federal/state roles; some provisions are purely federal,
effective without state participation, while others envision
the states and the federal government working in tandem.88
With regard to the exchanges, for example, state
participation is invited, with a federal backup. 89 The states
are meant to set up and operate exchanges, which are entities
that “facilitate[ ] the purchase” of health insurance.90 The
ACA sets out a mechanism for states to put in place their own
exchanges,91 but if a state does not set up an exchange, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services will establish and
operate an exchange in that state.92 This combination of state
and federal oversight represents a departure from the states’
traditional role as the exclusive authority over insurance,
healthcare, and public health matters within their borders.93
In other areas, the ACA sets a mandatory federal floor
for the states, preempting state law and imposing strict
penalties. The market reforms, for example, speak directly to
insurance companies—a state opt-in is not required for
head.” Id. at 2604. Because the Act offered the states no “genuine choice” or “real
option” other than to implement the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, reasoned the
Chief Justice, it “require[d] the States to govern according to Congress’
instructions,” violating the structural principles of federalism. Id. at 2602, 2605,
2607.
87. See, e.g., Bradley W. Joondeph, The Health Care Cases and the New
Meaning of Commandeering, 91 N.C. L. REV. 811, 832-36 (2013).
88. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 72, at 577 (“Some provisions
in the statute, like those concerning the insurance exchanges, are expressly
intended to be ‘state led’; others, like the Medicare provisions, are unquestionably
federally focused; still others, such as the Medicaid provisions and the insurance
regulation provisions, lie somewhere in between, with a role clearly foreseen for
state and federal regulators acting concurrently.”).
89. ACA § 1311(b)(1)(A).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. § 1321(c). To operate its exchanges in non-state-exchange states, HHS
contracts with not-for-profit entities. Id.; 45 C.F.R. § 155 (2014).
93. Thomson, supra note 72, at 549 (citing STARR, supra note 72)).

2015]

OBAMACARE INTERRUPTED

443

implementation.94 While the states can enact laws that are
more consumer-friendly than those in the ACA, provisions
such as the prohibition on barring consumers with preexisting conditions apply, regardless of a particular state’s
desires.95 With regard to providing a summary of benefits and
coverage, for example, the ACA sets a compliance standard,
preempts all state laws that require less disclosure than the
federal standard, and imposes a strict penalty of $1000 per
day, per violation, per insured person.96
Cooperative federalism’s dual state and federal
implementation is not without its pitfalls—the federal
government’s delegation of authority to the states poses a
risk of “uncooperative administration.”97 While the ACA is
not the first program to call for state and federal cooperation,
it was passed in a highly partisan atmosphere in which ACA
opposition has become almost a badge of honor among certain
groups.98 The ACA passed without a single Republican vote,99
94. E.g., ACA §§ 2704-06.
95. See id. § 2701(a)(1) (stating that insurers may not discriminate on the basis
of gender and describing other bases for price differences).
96. Id. § 2715.
97. Some have predicted that as designed, the ACA’s approach to cooperative
federalism is destined to fail, due to possible continued constitutional challenges
and political debate, particularly with regard to the exchanges. See Thomson,
supra note 72, at 550. Thomson argues that because very little variation in the
state exchanges is contemplated, the exchange program does not harness the
potential benefits of cooperative federalism, and the exchanges would be better
suited to be an exclusively federal construct. Id.; see also Gluck, Intrastatutory
Federalism, supra note 72, at 605 (noting that “[t]he ability of states to opt out of
administering federal programs or to administer them disloyally illustrates one
kind of ‘autonomy’ that states still retain, and is something that significantly
distinguishes them from federal agencies.”).
98. EZEKIEL J. EMANUEL, REINVENTING AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 280 (2014)
(describing the partisan atmosphere as one in which “conservatives—politicians
and the conservative media—were literally rooting for the ACA to crash and took
every glitch as an opportunity to declare it a total failure.”).
99. On December 24, 2009, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
passed the Senate with sixty votes in favor and thirty-nine opposed; the positive
votes were all from Democrats. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress-1st
Session, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_
call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00396 (last visited Mar. 17,
2015). The House voted on March 21, 2010, with 220 in favor and 211 against,
with the votes in favor still coming only from Democrats. Final Vote Results for

444

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

and it remains a highly controversial law, dividing public
opinion. According to national polls, at the end of April 2014,
after the first open enrollment period closed, 46% of people
had a negative opinion of the ACA, while 38% of people had
a positive opinion of the law.100 Public sentiment against the
ACA was and remains particularly strong in southern,
Republican-led states.101
Roll Call 167, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://clerk.house.gov
/evs/2010/roll167.xml (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). In the reconciliation process,
the Senate voted fifty-six in favor and forty-three against to approve the bill and
its amendments on March 25, 2010. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress2nd Session, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/
roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=2&vote=00105 (last visited Mar.
17, 2015).
100. Public Opinion on the ACA at the End of the First Open Enrollment Period,
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/slideshow/public-opinion-onthe-aca-at-the-end-of-the-first-open-enrollment-period (last visited Mar. 17,
2015).
101. In a New York Times/Kaiser poll of individuals in Arkansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, and North Carolina, the majority of individuals disapproved of the
ACA. In Arkansas, 62% disapproved; in Kentucky, 55% disapproved; in
Louisiana, 59% disapproved, and in North Carolina, 54% disapproved. Sabrina
Tavernise & Allison Kopicki, Southerners Don’t Like Obamacare. They Also Don’t
Want to Repeal It, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
04/24/health/health-law-repeal-has-little-support-poll-finds.html?_r=0. In Texas,
54% disapproved and 33% approved. Texans on the Affordable Care Act, TEX.
POLITICS
PROJECT
(Oct.
2013),
http://texaspolitics.utexas.edu/archive/
html/poll/features/201310_ACA/slide1.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). Opinion
on the ACA is divided along party lines. For example, 11% of Texas Democrats
oppose the law and 73% favor it, while 85% of Texas Republicans opposing the
law and 4% favor it. Texans on the Affordable Care Act, TEX. POLITICS PROJECT
(Oct. 2013), http://texaspolitics.utexas.edu/archive/html/poll/features/201310_
ACA/slide2.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2015); see also Lizette Alvarez & Robert
Pear, Florida Among States Undercutting Health Care Enrollment, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/18/us/florida-among-statesundercutting-health-care-enrollment.html?pagewanted=all (reporting on the
opposition from Florida, Missouri, and Ohio Republicans). Nationally, opinion
polls show a partisan divide in opinions on the ACA, with 68% of Democrats
approving of the ACA and 17% disapproving in April 2014, while 76% of
Republicans disapproved and 11% approved. Health Tracking Poll Exploring the
Public’s Views on the Affordable Care Act, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
http://kff.org/interactive/health-tracking-poll-exploring-the-publics-views-on-theaffordable-care-act-aca (last visited Mar. 17, 2015) (follow “PARTY ID” link; then
follow “Democrat” or “Republican” link); see also KYLE A. DROPP ET AL., CTR. FOR
EFFECTIVE PUB. MGMT., THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: AN EXPERIMENT IN
FEDERALISM? 2 (2013), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/
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Acceptance or rejection of the ACA tends to follow party
lines—the twelve states with governors and both chambers
of their legislatures controlled by Democrats have all opted
to operate their own exchanges.102 Of the twenty-seven states
giving control of exchanges to the federal government,
twenty-four have Republican governors; twenty-two of the
twenty-seven have Republican-majority state Senates.103
Republican leaders are under intense pressure to reject the
ACA.104 Some posit that those states that have declined to
implement the exchanges have leaders who actively want the
ACA to fail.105 In that regard, the ACA faces challenges to
implementation that other programs based on cooperative
federalism have not.106 Perhaps predictably, in the
implementation of certain ACA provisions involving
informational transparency for consumers, the intended
cooperative federalism has splintered into obstructive
federalism that undermines the ACA’s goals with regard to
consumers.
B. Obstructive Federalism and the ACA’s Transparency
Provisions
While the Medicaid non-expansion is the best known
area of anti-ACA states’ resistance, certain states’ rejection
of the ACA’s outreach and informational transparency
provisions is damaging too. And, while opposition to the
files/papers/2013/10/affordable%20care%20act%20experiment%20in%20federali
sm/droppjackman%20and%20jackmanaca%20experment%20in%20federalism10
2213.pdf (noting the “partisan opposition to health care reform at the state level”).
102. DROPP ET AL., supra note 101, at 1, 4-6.
103. Id. at 6.
104. See Sara Rosenbaum, Can This Marriage Be Saved? Federalism and the
Future of U.S. Health Policy Under the Affordable Care Act, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 167, 170-71 (2014) (describing the polemics against any move towards
cooperative federalism).
105. DROPP ET AL., supra note 101, at 6.
106. NAT’L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., REFLECTIONS ON IMPLEMENTING MEDICARE (M.G.
Gluck & V. Reno eds., 2001), available at http://www.nasi.org/usr_doc/
med_report_reflections.pdf; Jonathan Oberlander, Obamacare Faces Hurdles
that Medicare Did Not, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2013/05/29/is-obamacare-too-complicated-to-succeed/obamacarefaces-hurdles-that-medicare-did-not.

446

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

Medicaid expansion and other provisions is softening in
many states due to pragmatic concerns, the anti-information
stance shows little sign of retreat.
1. Obstructive Federalism and the Softening
Opposition to Medicaid’s Expansion
The anti-ACA states’ refusal to expand Medicaid is their
most heavily criticized act of opposition. But the same states
that loudly reject the expansion are at the same time working
quietly to find pragmatic solutions that may eventually
expand Medicaid almost as the ACA’s drafters originally
designed.
The ACA was drafted with the Medicaid expansion
fulfilling an important place in the patchwork of health
insurance coverage opportunities that would, together, bring
a new thirty-two million people under the health insurance
umbrella.107 Medicaid previously insured mainly individuals
in defined categories, such as children, parents with
dependent children, the disabled, and the elderly.108 The
expansion would have made individuals eligible for Medicaid
provided they earn no more than 138% of the poverty line.109
Those with higher incomes are eligible for federal tax
subsidies of their premiums through federal law and with no
state participation necessary.110 With the mandatory
Medicaid expansion deemed unconstitutional under Sebelius,
twenty-four states (as of March 2014) have decided not to
expand Medicaid in their states.111
Despite the strident political opposition to expanding
Medicaid, there are signs of softening opposition in some
states. Even the state of Texas, whose governor once
107. See Hall, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
108. The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in States that Do Not Expand
Medicaid, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 2, 2014),
http://kff.org/report-section/the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-statesthat-do-not-expand-medicaid.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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compared the Medicaid expansion to the Titanic,112 seems to
show some signs that pragmatic fiscal concerns might
eventually result in a negotiated settlement over the
expansion of Medicaid.113 A more pragmatic approach is
palatable to many constituencies, such as charitable groups114
and healthcare providers.115 When individuals do not have
health insurance, they pay “only about 35-38% of the total
medical costs they incur.”116 The remainder of the cost is paid
by charitable organizations, the insured, and the
government, while the providers themselves end up paying
the balance.117 Hospitals are bearing the brunt of the failure
to expand Medicaid, as they continue to see low-income
patients; but the low-income patients lack health insurance
coverage or Medicaid to pay their bills.118 Hospitals are
therefore likely to become advocates for the expansion of
112. Kathryn Smith, Rick Perry: Medicaid Is Like Adding People to Titanic,
POLITICO (July 9, 2012, 12:22 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0712/
78239.html.
113. Texas officials continue to push for a federal block grant to expand
Medicaid as the state sees fit—to date, this proposal has not been accepted. See,
e.g., Becca Aaronson, Zerwas Proposes Alternative to Medicaid Expansion, TEX.
TRIBUNE (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.texastribune.org/2013/04/16/zerwasproposes-alternative-medicaid-expansion.
114. See generally STACEY CHAZIN & VERONICA GUERRA, CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE
STRATEGIES, INC., IMPACT OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON CHARITY CARE
PROGRAMS (2013), available at http://www.chcs.org/media/Charity_Care_
Brief__090413_FINAL.pdf.
115. Pressure continues to build on the governor, however, given the anticipated
reductions in funding for hospitals that treat the uninsured. See Becca Aaronson,
Without Medicaid Expansion, Hospitals Seek Long-Term Solution, TEX. TRIBUNE
(Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.texastribune.org/2014/02/14/without-medicaidexpansion-hospitals-seek-long-ter.
116. Edward A. Morse, Lifting the Fog: Navigating Penalties in the Affordable
Care Act, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 207, 216 (2013) (citing Brief Amici Curiae of
Economic Scholars in Support of Defendants-Appellees at 13, Liberty Univ., Inc.
v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-2347)).
117. See Brief Amici Curiae of Economic Scholars in Support of DefendantAppellees, supra note 116, at 13-14.
118. See Jonathan Oberlander, The Future of Obamacare, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED.
2165-67 (2012); State’s Inaction on Coverage for the Working Poor Has
Consequences for Uninsured, Taxpayers, Hospitals, TEX. HOSP. ASS’N.,
https://www.tha.org/HealthCareProviders/Issues/HealthCareCoverage/StatesIn
actiononCoF0933/index.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
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Medicaid.119 Given these considerations, some opposition
states have found more palatable a plan that supplements
private health insurance but does not directly expand the
Medicaid program.120 Because the states stand to gain
considerable federal funds from the Medicaid expansion,
expanding Medicaid in some fashion would make sense.121
Some predict that after the 2016 election, states that now
reject the Medicaid expansion will opt to expand Medicaid, in
two waves.122 The last wave will include states such as Texas,
which may take until after the 2020 election to expand, just
as the last state to implement Medicaid did so seventeen
years after the program’s enactment.123 Thus, even as
governors and legislators in anti-ACA states declare their
opposition to the Medicaid expansion, their stance is shifting.
In addition, state health officials are moving forward with
other reforms on the ground.124 The rejection of Medicaid’s
expansion is thus yielding to political and financial costs that
do not apply as directly to the consumer information
transparency provisions.
2. Obstructive Federalism’s Hostility to Consumer
Information Transparency
Some anti-ACA states remain steadfastly against many
of the informational transparency provisions that invite state
participation and that would help consumers obtain their
119. See Oberlander, The Future of Obamacare, supra note 118, at 2166.
120. Indiana Governor Mike Pence, for example, urged repeal of the ACA yet
offered a solution to the non-expansion of Medicaid in his state. Ken Thomas,
Pence Promotes Alternative Healthcare Proposal, AP NEWS (May 19, 2014),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/pence-promotes-health-care-proposal-dc. His plan
would enlarge an existing Indiana program, which provides health savings
accounts to those with incomes of up to 138% of the poverty line. Id. The governor
believes that this program allows people to make their own choices with regard
to health insurance. Id.
121. EMANUEL, supra note 98, at 295.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 295-97.
124. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 72, at 591 (noting that “at the
same time that governors (and state attorneys general) in a number of states that
are publicly opposing the new reforms, their state bureaucracies are moving
ahead (with the governors’ approval) to implement them.”).
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ACA benefits and rights. While certain informational
transparency provisions take effect without regard to the
states’ actions or opinions, others call for state participation.
Significantly, the provisions that concern communication
with consumers on the ground regarding their options and
their rights are also those that give states the greatest
flexibility in their implementation.
Unlike the non-expansion of Medicaid, the undermining
of informational transparency operates quietly, with little
controversy. While the non-expansion of Medicaid has
awoken a groundswell of stakeholder opposition, the
undermining of informational transparency provisions has
provoked little push to reverse course.
a. Refusing State Exchanges. States that decline to
implement their own exchanges are declining not just a
purchasing place for consumers, but the opportunity to
promote health insurance to the uninsured, to increase
enrollment, and to connect citizens to other programs.
The ACA allows states to set up their own health
insurance exchanges but provides a federal exchange for
states that do not implement their own.125 The ACA permits
and encourages variety in state implementation of the
exchanges.126 Twenty-seven states have declined to set up
exchanges to sell and promote health insurance purchases.127
Citizens of these states can still shop for federally-subsidized
health insurance and compare plan costs and other features
by using the federal exchanges.128 Given this federal fallback,

125. See ACA § 1321(c).
126. The ACA mentions “state flexibility” numerous times, see id. §§ 1321, 1331,
1412, and also has a waiver provision allowing states to apply for permission to
use their own programs to accomplish the ACA’s goal. See id. § 1332.
127. State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2015, THE HENRY J. KAISER
FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/health-insuranceexchanges (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
128. TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES & THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: KEY POLICY ISSUES 31 (2010), available at
http://www.thalassemia.org/updates/pdf/HealthInsuranceExchanges.pdf (noting
that the ACA “establishes federal fallback authority to create a federal exchange
as well as a multistate insurance program.”).
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does state non-participation matter?129 The early signs
suggest that it does.
Citizens of non-exchange states can still shop for the
ACA’s federally-subsidized insurance, but insurance
availability is not the state exchanges’ only intended
function—state exchanges serve a connective and
informational function too. The ACA requires that when
states set up their own exchanges, the exchange must have
“streamline[d] and simplif[ied] application processes” for the
state’s state and federal healthcare programs.130 Thus, when
fully integrated with a state’s other public programs, a state
exchange can funnel participants to an array of other
programs.131 At its most ambitious and integrated, a state
exchange can disseminate information through vertical and
horizontal integration of federal and state benefits.132 An
exchange can thereby increase uptake in a variety of
programs by serving as a full service access point.133 Through
approaches such as these, the exchanges can limit the
“bureaucratic disentitlement” that limits participation in

129. See Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 72, at 565.
130. EAST BAY CMTY. LAW CTR., THE OBAMACARE OPPORTUNITY: IMPLEMENTING
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT TO IMPROVE HEALTH, REDUCE HARDSHIP, AND GROW THE

ECONOMY FOR ALL CALIFORNIANS 10 (2013) [hereinafter EAST BAY, OBAMACARE
OPPORTUNITY], available at https://ebclc.org/documents/Obamacare_Opportunity.
2013.08.pdf.
131. JOST, supra note 128, at 30 (“The exchanges play important roles as
advocates of insurance affordability, as administrators of cost-sharing reduction
subsidies, and as gateways to other public programs.”).
132. EAST BAY, OBAMACARE OPPORTUNITY, supra note 130.
133. See id. at 4. One non-exchange state—Pennsylvania—provides an example
of such access. Pennsylvania provides access to thirteen benefit programs using a
single application. Id. at 15 n.81 (noting that “COMPASS integrates the
applications of the following programs: Medicaid, Medicare, CHIP, case
assistance (TANF, diversion program, state blind program, refugee cash
assistance program), LIHEAP, SNAP, home and community-based services, long
term care, and school meals”). ACA exchanges could act as a similar one-stop
place to enroll in numerous programs.
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benefits.134 The state exchanges thus present an opportunity
to improve access to benefits for individuals and families.135
Early statistics show some indications that generally,
states with their own exchanges have achieved greater
enrollment of uninsured individuals than have states that
rely on the federal exchanges.136 Enrollment is higher in those
states with their own exchanges, and those states spent
larger amounts of money on promotion of health insurance to
potential insureds.137 The states with federally-facilitated
exchanges did, however, enjoy a surge in enrollment toward
the end of the enrollment period.138 Despite the surge,
enrollment of uninsured individuals still lags in states
without exchanges.139 The reasons for this lag are difficult to
134. Id. at 9.
The negative effect of quality control reports is an example of
“bureaucratic disentitlement”: largely obscure bureaucratic actions and
inactions that effectively reduce welfare benefits by making participation
in the program more difficult. The sources of such reductions, political in
nature, are often difficult to pinpoint. They usually appear as
administrative decisions, such as budgetary allocations or cut backs, but
directly affect the receipt of benefits. Bureaucratic disentitlement thus
keeps welfare agencies from meeting their constituents’ needs.
Maria Fazzolari, The Brown v. Guiliani Injunction: Combating Bureaucratic
Disentitlement, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 413, 421-22 (1996).
135. EAST BAY, OBAMACARE OPPORTUNITY, supra note 130, at 10.
136. DANIEL E. POLSKY ET AL., ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., DECIPHERING THE
DATA: FINAL ENROLLMENT RATES SHOW FEDERALLY RUN MARKETPLACES MAKE UP
LOST GROUND AT END OF OPEN ENROLLMENT 2-3 (2014) [hereinafter POLSKY ET AL.,
FINAL ENROLLMENT], available at http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/
issue_briefs/2014/rwjf411792; DANIEL E. POLSKY ET AL., ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON
FOUND., DECIPHERING THE DATA: STATE-BASED MARKETPLACES SPENT HEAVILY TO
HELP ENROLL CONSUMERS 3 (2014) [hereinafter POLSKY ET AL., STATE-BASED
MARKETPLACES], available at http://ldihealtheconomist.com/media/state-based_
marketplaces_spent_heavily_to_enroll_consumers.pdf (“Enrollment data to date
suggests wide variations in how successful states were in enrolling their eligible
populations in private plans with [state-based exchange states], in general,
having more success than [state with federally-facilitated marketplaces].”).
137. POLSKY ET AL., FINAL ENROLLMENT, supra note 136, at 2-3.
138. Id. at 1, 5 (noting that while enrollment in states with state-run exchanges
still outpaced those with federal exchanges, “the federally facilitated
marketplaces and some of the troubled state-based ones made up some ground in
the last four to six weeks of the open enrollment period.”).
139. Id. at 2.
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pinpoint and are likely multiple. One possible reason,
however, is that citizens are more willing to look to state
resources for help with insurance.140
Another is the federally-facilitated exchange states’ lack
of support for outreach, as discussed below. Many argue that
the key to a successful exchange is marketing and
promotion.141 In states relying exclusively on the federal
exchange, there is often a lack of the most basic information
about the availability of health insurance on the federal
exchange.142 And, as described below, these states also tend
to be the same ones that have rejected navigators, consumer
assistance centers, and other forms of information
dissemination set out in the ACA.
Thus, by abdicating responsibility for the exchanges to
the federal government, the states are missing an
opportunity to promote their own exchanges and improve
enrollment.

140. Id. at 5 (speculating that the states’ traditional role in insurance may have
contributed to their faster start in enrollment).
141. “One of the key takeaways regarding enrollment is that advertising and
strong political support are critical to successful enrollment.” Zarak Khan,
Behavioral Economics and the Affordable Care Act: What States Should Know As
They Design Health Insurance Exchanges 6 (Apr. 17, 2013) (unpublished
Master’s thesis, Sanford School of Public Policy) (on file with the Duke University
Library system); see POLSKY ET AL., FINAL ENROLLMENT, supra note 136, at 5
(noting that “structural decisions may ultimately not be as important in
enrollment success as more process-oriented ones, such as marketing and
outreach to eligible populations, and consumer assistance in navigating the new
marketplaces.”).
142. In Oklahoma, for example, citizens who turn to their state insurance
department’s website for help with health insurance find no information about
the federal exchange. See Warren Vieth, State Makes Little Effort to Promote
Health Exchange, OKLAHOMA WATCH (Aug. 17, 2013), http://oklahomawatch.org/
2013/08/17/state-offers-little-help-with-navigating-health-exchange (noting that,
six weeks before the ACA’s 2013-14 open enrollment was to begin, the state
department of health website had no information about the possibility of signing
up for health insurance on the federal exchange and the department of insurance
discussed the state’s opposition to the ACA without any information on signing
up for health insurance).
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b. Silencing Enrollment Outreach. Lack of information
remains a major barrier to enrollment in public health care
programs.143 The purchase of health insurance is a complex
one, requiring knowledge of where and how to purchase
insurance, the features of various plans, and the available
subsidies—outreach and marketing is therefore crucial.
Nevertheless, some states impose restrictions on navigators
and burden or reject other avenues of communication about
the ACA. Former Health and Human Services Secretary
Kathleen Sebelius asserted that Republicans are purposely
keeping information from would-be ACA enrollees.144
Purposeful or not, the result of these burdens and
information gaps is a form of soft bureaucratic
disentitlement,145 by which individuals are unable to claim
the benefits to which they are entitled, due to bureaucratic
actions or inactions. Specific actions against informational
transparency for enrollees include the burdening of
navigators and the refusal of funds for consumer assistance
centers.
i. Burdening Navigators. As explained above, the ACA
recognizes potential enrolleees’ need for information and
provides that insurance navigators will assist in explaining
the law and helping individuals enroll in new insurance.
Where a state does not develop its own exchange, the federal
exchange acts as a fallback, together with its own navigator
143. EAST BAY, OBAMACARE OPPORTUNITY, supra note 130, at 8 (“Some people
who are eligible do not apply for benefits because they do not know about the
program or do not realize they qualify for it.”); Jennifer Stuber & Elizabeth
Bradley, Barriers to Medicaid Enrollment: Who Is at Risk?, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
292 (2005) (noting that about twenty percent of poor children are not enrolled in
Medicaid and analyzing risk factors for failed uptake, such as health status, race,
level of education, lack of access to transportation, and complexity of enrollment
procedures).
144. According to Sebelius, “[t]he single largest challenge is to get information
to individuals who may be eligible for benefits but really don’t know anything
about the market.’’ Daniel Chang, Sebelius Spreads the Word on Healthcare
Reform in Miami-Dade, MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.miamiherald.
com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article1955172.html
(noting
that
Sebelius thought Florida Republicans had been “keeping information from
people” and stating that the greatest challenge was getting information to those
people who might want to enroll).
145. See Fazzolari, supra note 134, at 421-22.
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program. HHS issued regulations for navigators’ training
and conduct.146 The fact that the navigators are federally
certified and monitored has not dissuaded some states from
imposing additional requirements. Many of the states
without their own exchanges have also enacted navigatorburdening legislation, further compounding the lack of
outreach associated with the absence of a state exchange.147
While a clear causal relationship between burdened
navigators and low ACA enrollment is difficult to confirm,
some analysis suggests a link between the burdens and lower
enrollment.148
Restrictions have included additional education and
licensing requirements, and even restrictions on the content
of information navigators can provide. Missouri, for example,
passed its Health Insurance Marketplace Innovation Act of
146. 45 C.F.R. 155 (2014). The federal regulation requires
a certified application counselor program. It creates conflict-of-interest,
training and certification, and meaningful access standards; clarifies
that any licensing, certification, or other standards prescribed by a state
or Exchange must not prevent application of the provisions of title I of
the Affordable Care Act; adds entities with relationships to issuers of
stop loss insurance to the list of entities that are ineligible to become
Navigators; and clarifies that the same ineligibility criteria that apply to
Navigators apply to certain non-Navigator assistance personnel. The
final rule also directs that each Exchange designate organizations which
will then certify their staff members and volunteers to be application
counselors that assist consumers and facilitate enrollment in qualified
health plans and insurance affordability programs, and provides
standards for that designation.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Exchange Functions: Standards for
Navigators and Non-Navigator Assistance Personnel; Consumer Assistance Tools
and Programs of an Exchange and Certified Application Counselors, 78 Fed. Reg.
42,824, 42,824 (July 17, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 155).
147. See Justin Giovannelli et al., Under Pressure: An Update on Restrictive
State Insurance Marketplace Consumer Assistance Laws, THE COMMONWEALTH
FUND (Oct. 31, 2013), www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2013/
oct/under-pressure (“For Americans living in states with federally run
marketplaces—where consumer outreach efforts have been modest to begin
with—this chilling effect only makes it harder to learn about the health law and
enroll in coverage.”).
148. See POLSKY ET AL., STATE-BASED MARKETPLACES, supra note 136, at 3 (“The
effectiveness of the Navigators themselves might have differed from state to state,
especially in states that create barriers to assister programs.”).
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2013, which classified all federal navigators as state
navigators149 and imposed stringent state requirements on all
navigators. On January 23, 2014, a federal judge in the
Western District of Missouri issued a preliminary injunction
for these additional requirements, finding them unduly
burdensome on the federal law.150 Under the Missouri law,
navigators would have had to obtain a state license (in
addition to the required federal license) and comply with
continuing education requirements;151 navigators would also
have had to become “insurance producers” under state law,
which are insurance agents or insurance companies.152 In
striking down the Missouri law, the court pointed out that
the Missouri law precluded navigators from performing some
functions that federal law required them to perform.153
The State of Texas also enacted navigator requirements,
complaining in the preamble to its new regulations that the
federal regulations were not sufficiently stringent.154 The
Texas requirements were enacted on January 21, 2014, and
required compliance by March 1, 2014—with the 2014 open
enrollment window set to close on March 31, 2014, the timing
149. In Missouri, a State Navigator is defined as a person who “for
compensation, provides information or services in connection with eligibility,
enrollment, or program specifications of any health benefit exchange operating in
this state . . . .” MO. REV. STAT. § 376.2000(4) (2014).
150. See St. Louis Effort for AIDS v. Huff, 996 F. Supp. 2d 798 (W.D. Mo. 2014).
151. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 376.2002(1), 2004(5), 2006(3) (2014).
152. Id. §§ 375.012(6), 014 (2014).
153. St. Louis Effort for AIDS, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 806 (noting that federal
navigators are required to “distribute fair and impartial information concerning
enrollment” in health plans as well as information regarding tax credits, while
the state law prohibited navigators from giving “advice concerning the benefits,
terms and features of a particular health plan or offer advice about which
exchange health plan is better or worse” without licensing as an insurance agent).
The court found that the state law obstructed the federal purpose, because the
ACA requires HHS to contract only with non-profit entities and those who are not
receiving money from insurance companies—requiring that navigators be
insurance agents yet not be receiving monies from insurance companies was
therefore a “significant roadblock” to the ACA’s implantation and function. Id. at
807.
154. TEX. DEP’T OF INS., COMMISSIONER’S ORDER NO. 2962 (2014), available at
http://www.tdi.texas.gov/rules/2013/documents/navadoptionorder.pdf; see 28 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE §§ 19.4001-4017 (2014).
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left little leeway for navigators to comply and assist
consumers during that open enrollment period. The law
includes a twenty-hour training requirement, a background
check, and proof that the navigator has liability insurance.155
Four states—Georgia, Missouri, Ohio, and Tennessee—
prohibit navigators from advising potential enrollees on the
benefits and details of particular plans, even though the
federal rules call for navigators to help consumers make
informed decisions about healthcare and decide which plan
is best for the potential enrollee.156
The effect of these burdens has been hard to quantify, but
some analysis points to the navigator burdens as a reason for
lower ACA enrollment in such states.157
ii. Declining to Seek Consumer Assistance Center
Funding and Restricting Advice. Many states are refusing to
apply for the ACA’s grants for consumer assistance centers
that are meant to help potential enrollees understand their
options and rights; some states even prohibit non-ACA
advisors from helping consumers select a suitable health
plan.
The need for information is significant—of those
Americans without health insurance, only one in four
understands the meaning of terms such as “deductible,” “outof-pocket spending cap,” or “co-pay.”158 Those without a
college education—the demographic less likely to have
insurance159—were even less likely to answer the questions

155. See COMMISSIONER’S ORDER NO. 2962, supra note 154.
156. Giovannelli et al., supra note 147, at 2.
157. See POLSKY ET AL., STATE-BASED MARKETPLACES, supra note 136, at 3 (“The
effectiveness of the Navigators themselves might have differed from state to state,
especially in states that create barriers to assister programs.”).
158. See George Loewenstein et al., Consumers’ Misundertanding of Health
Insurance, 32 J. HEALTH ECON. 850, 858 (2013) (finding that only fourteen percent
of survey participants could correctly answer all four questions addressing the
basics of health insurance: deductibles, copays, coinsurance, and maximum out of
pocket costs).
159. See id. at 857.
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correctly.160 To address this health insurance literacy gap, the
ACA provides funding for consumer assistance centers.161
Twelve states and the District of Columbia currently
have these programs; the rest do not.162 A Kaiser Family
Foundation report notes, however, that even in the states
that have adopted them, the programs have not been
sufficiently funded.163 Although a second round of funding
was announced in 2014, this funding was limited, available
only to states that had obtained funding in the first round.164
160. See id.
161. ACA § 2793(e).
162. Consumer Assistance Program, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Consumer-Assistance-Grants (last visited
Mar. 17, 2015).
163. KAREN POLLITZ ET AL., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAL DEBT
AMONG PEOPLE WITH HEALTH INSURANCE 1, 21 (2014), available at
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/8537-medical-debtamong-people-with-health-insurance.pdf (noting that “the law authorizes ‘such
sums as are necessary’ to support CAPs but only appropriated $30 million.”). No
funding has been announced since 2012, even though the CAPs
are the only entities required, by federal law, to help privately insured
people resolve health plan complaints and claims disputes and file
appeals. Absent this help, as case studies illustrate, some people may
continue to be overwhelmed by insurance paperwork they cannot
understand and even incur debt for bills insurance should have paid.
Id. at 21.
164. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., LIMITED COMPETITION FOR AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT CONSUMER ASSISTANCE PROGRAM GRANTS 10 (2014), available at
https://www.grantsolutions.gov/gs/preaward/previewPublicAnnouncement.do?id
=49797 (follow “View PDF” link).
These grant funds can be used to re-establish, extend, or enhance
activities being funded under the 2010 grants. For example, if a
Consumer Assistance Program was performing an outreach campaign
that included a 6-month public service announcement (PSA) on the radio
under the 2010 grant award, that Consumer Assistance Program could
extend the PSA beyond the original six months, or add a different PSA.
The Consumer Assistance Program could also use these funds to add to
the radio campaign through other media not currently included in their
project plans, such as newspapers, local magazines, or television. Funds
awarded under this grant funding opportunity announcement cannot
supplant funding under any prior or future Consumer Assistance
Program funding opportunities if grant periods overlap.
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CONSUMER ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
LIMITED COMPETITION FUNDING OPPORTUNITY ANNOUNCEMENT FAQS (2014),
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Of the states that have not sought such help, many do not
have their own exchanges, which further exacerbates the
lack of information in those states. That is, states without
their own exchanges already lack the outreach that goes
along with exchanges,165 and those same states spend less
money on consumer assistance.166 And, the states using the
federal exchange have a far higher proportion of uninsured
individuals to begin with than in those states with state
exchanges.167
In the states that have implemented citizens’ assistance
programs, the results have been promising, and citizens have
been helped. The states that have sought and accepted funds
have spent them on programs such as consumer education,
advocacy, and assistance.168 With additional millions of
dollars, states are able to implement programs providing
direct, local assistance to consumers, to inform them of their
rights and help them with health insurance issues.169
available
at
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/
Downloads/Final-CAP-Limited-FOA-External-FAQ-08-13-2014.pdf.
165. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
166. See POLSKY ET AL., STATE-BASED MARKETPLACES, supra note 136, at 3 (“By
comparing consumer assistance funds to the uninsured, we found consumer
assistance funds to be more concentrated in [state-based marketplace] states.
[State based marketplace] accounted for 50% of total consumer assistance funds,
although they have just 31% of all uninsured. In contrast, 63% of the uninsured
live in [federally-facilitated marketplace] states, which accounted for 33% of the
funding. The five partnership states in charge of consumer assistance functions
were home to just 6% of the uninsured, but garnered 17% of the funding”).
167. See id.
168. Consumer Assistance Program, N.Y. STATE OF HEALTH (July 22, 2010),
http://info.nystateofhealth.ny.gov/resource/consumer-assistance-program;
see
also Consumer Assistance Program Grants: How States Are Using New Resource
to Give Consumers Greater Control of Their Health Care, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., http://cms.gov/CCIIO/resources/grants/cap-grants-states.html
(last visited Mar. 17, 2015) (noting that New York used the money to enhance the
capacity of partnering community based organizations to strengthen their
geographical reach, provide more services, increase helpline capacity deepen
presentation skills to educate consumers, educate staff about consumer appeals
and how to assist with appeals, and strengthen overall assistance to consumers).
169. For example, California was awarded $4,635,952. Ani Fete, Consumer
Assistance Programs Get $20 Million from HHS, ENROLL AMERICA (Aug. 30, 2012,
3:28
PM),
http://www.enrollamerica.org/blog/2012/08/consumer-assistance-
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Some states’ restrictions on consumer assistance go
beyond a rejection of the ACA’s consumer assistance
centers—Georgia and Illinois place restrictions on
individuals and community groups that might attempt to
help potential enrollees assess different coverage options.170
Tennessee’s restrictions were so broad that a lawsuit
resulted in an agreement that the restrictions would not be
enforced so broadly.171
c. Missing Information for Enforcement. To enforce the
new rules and protect consumer rights, consumers must
learn their rights and enforcement officials must know that
a problem exists. States are meant to be the primary
enforcers of compliance with health insurance market
reforms, such as the new appeals process and others.172
Where the states lack the authority or ability to enforce the
provisions, enforcement is left to the federal government.
For example, the ACA provides that individual and group
health coverage must provide for external review of denied
claims.173 The process is complex, and the vast majority of
consumers never seek even an internal appeal of a denied
claim. Most are completely unaware of any available
consumer assistance.174 To remedy this situation, and to help
consumers to understand and progress through the process,
notices of claim denial (known as Explanations of Benefits or
programs-get-20-million-from-hhs. It plans to “[p]artner with non-profit
community-based organizations to provide direct, local consumer assistance;”
“[c]reate appropriate, accessible health care consumer information and resources
for seniors and Californians with disabilities;” and “[e]xpand existing resources
and training materials for consumer assistance organizations[.]” Consumer
Assistance Program Grants: How States Are Using New Resource to Give
Consumers Greater Control of Their Health Care, supra note 168.
170. Giovannelli et al., supra note 147.
171. Id.; see Agreed Final Order, League of Women Voters of Tenn. v. McPeak,
No. 13-1365-IV (Tenn. Ch. Oct. 7, 2013), available at http://www.tnjustice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/Agreed-Final-Order-as-Entered.pdf.
172. See ACA §§ 2701, 2719; Compliance, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Health-InsuranceMarket-Reforms/compliance.html [hereinafter CMS, Compliance].
173. ACA § 2719(b).
174. POLLITZ ET AL., supra note 163.
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EOBs) must inform consumers about any available
ombudsman or consumer assistance office created by the
states under the ACA that can offer help.175
When the state declines to set up such a consumer
assistance center, the information on the EOB then directs
consumers to the Department of Labor (“DOL”).176 The DOL
will attempt to resolve the dispute through informal
settlement procedures.177 There is, however, a bias against
the federal government’s involvement with health insurance,
particularly among Republicans,178 such that the federal

175. ACA § 2719; 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715–2719(b)(2)(ii)(E)(5) (2014)
(“The plan and issuer must disclose the availability of, and contact information
for, any applicable office of health insurance consumer assistance or ombudsman
established under PHS Act section 2793 to assist individuals with the internal
claims and appeals and external review processes.”).
176. DEP’T OF LABOR, TECHNICAL RELEASE 2011-01 3 (2011), available at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/tr11-01.pdf.
177. See, e.g., id. The DOL offers the following assistance with disputes:
Complaints involving alleged violations of ERISA are handled by Benefit
Advisors in our national and field offices. Those who file complaints with
us can expect a prompt and courteous response from our staff. Every
complaint received will be pursued and, if determined to be valid,
resolution will be sought through informal dispute resolution. You can
expect to receive a status report from the assigned benefits advisor every
30 days. If your valid complaint cannot be resolved informally, it may be
referred for further review by our enforcement staff. While we cannot
ensure that every complaint will result in an investigation, at the
conclusion of enforcement activity, if requested, we will furnish an
understandable explanation of the outcome of our review and
investigation.
About the Employee Benefits Security Administration, DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/aboutebsa/main.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
178. DROPP ET AL., supra note 101, at 15 (“Republicans have significantly less
confidence in the successful implementation of the exchanges when told that they
will be managed by the federal government. Republicans are more than twice as
likely to exhibit confidence in state-run exchanges (43 percent) compared with
federally-managed exchanges (20 percent).”). When asked whether the state or
federal government should provide health insurance for low-income people, only
about a quarter of the people said that the federal government should provide it
(24% in Arkansas, 26% in Kentucky, 25% in Louisiana, 27% in North Carolina).
The majority said that the state or local government should handle it (46% in
Arkansas, 48% in Kentucky, 47% in Louisiana, 47% in North Carolina). N.Y.
TIMES & THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., POLLS IN FOUR SOUTHERN STATES,
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government may not to be the source that citizens turn to for
information about insurance help. The absence of a state
consumer assistance center coupled with this bias against
federal help for such matters suggests that enforcement may
be hobbled in these states. In this manner, the new appeal
process, often lauded as one of the ACA’s greatest additions
to the panoply of consumer protections,179 is undermined by
lack of state participation. Notice of consumer assistance
centers is particularly important, because studies such as the
recent Kaiser Family Foundation report indicate that
individuals often do not know when there is help available or
how to find it.180
Consumer assistance centers—which, as explained
above, most states have refused—do not only disseminate
information, but collect it too for purposes of enforcement.
Consumer assistance center grants are conditioned upon the
entity’s promise to collect information to be used for targeted
enforcement.181 In these states, then, state officials have less

6
[hereinafter
Polls
in
Four
Southern
States],
available
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/8580-t2.pdf.

at

179. Candy Sagon, New Tools Help Fight Health Claim Denials, AARP BULL.,
Sept. 2010, at 4 (“Fighting back when your health insurance company denies a
claim just got a little easier, thanks to federal rules recently issued under the
healthcare overhaul law.”); Alison Young, Rules to Ease Consumer Appeals in
Health Coverage, USA TODAY, July 23-25, 2010 at 3A.
180. POLLITZ ET AL., supra note 163, at 4 (noting that most individuals surveyed
did not know where to seek help and that the “burdens of illness made it harder
to resolve problems on their own”). In the Kaiser report’s case studies, person
after person reported that they did not know their state had a Consumer
Assistance Program. Id. at 23 (“[Consumer] did not know her state has a
Consumer Assistance Program that would help her file an appeal”); id. at 25
(describing a consumer who wrote to his congressman and others for help but did
not know his state had a Consumer Assistance Program that could have helped
him with appeals).
181. Dept. of Health & Human Service, Affordable Care Act (ACA)—Consumer
Assistance Program Grants, Initial Announcement Invitation to Apply for FY 2010
3-7 (Jul. 2010) (“[Programs must] collect data on consumer inquiries and
complaints to help the Secretary identify problems in the marketplace and
strengthen enforcement . . . . States must demonstrate that designees can
advocate freely and vigorously on behalf of consumers . . . [and] are capable of
reporting objective data to the Secretary on the responsiveness of agencies that
oversee private health insurance and group health plans and public

462

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

information regarding potential problems, and consumers
are less likely to know their rights.
The federal fallback remains an option, but can it really
be effective? Its role is limited by logistical issues as well as
state primacy in such matters—the measured approach to
enforcement reflected in HHS’s statements reflects these
limitations.182 The federal government’s approach to
enforcement is incremental and careful out of fear of being
labelled unconstitutional commandeering.183 Even so, the
federal government’s role is necessary, given that Alabama,
Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming have all stated
that they lack authority to enforce any ACA market
reforms.184
The federal government can enforce the market reforms
either when a state indicates that it will not do so, or when it
becomes apparent that “a State has failed to substantially
enforce a provision” of the ACA involving “the issuance, sale,
renewal, and offering of health insurance coverage in
connection with group health plans or individual health
insurance.”185 Federal intervention is permitted if a
complaint is filed with the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services,186 if news media reports indicate a
problem,187 or if “any other information” indicates that the
state is not enforcing the market reforms.188 One
commentator has described this process as “painfully”
coverage . . . . There should be staff available to answer consumer calls in real
time.”).
182. See CMS, Compliance, supra note 172.
183. Rosenbaum, supra note 104, at 178-79 (noting that “[t]he solution may be
messy, but conceptually it hangs together . . . the approach is at least conceptually
workable”).
184. CMS, Compliance, supra note 172.
185. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–22(a)(2) (2012). The Public Health Service Act explains
the Secretary’s and the federal enforcement powers, which can involve civil money
penalties and a means for determining liability. Rosenbaum, supra note 104, at
180 n.67 (noting that states retain the sole power to act upon the issuer’s license).
186. 45 C.F.R. § 150.205(a) (2014).
187. Id. § 150.205(c); see id. § 150.101 (providing that CMS has jurisdiction over
the market reforms).
188. Id. § 150.205(f).
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deferential to the states.189 Even when a problem is
uncovered, the process still returns to the state to determine
“whether the affected individual or entity has made
reasonable efforts to exhaust available State remedies.”190
The enforcement process itself is equally deferential to
the states. Enforcement begins by consulting with the state
in question.191 Not only is enforcement deferential and
protracted, but it is hard to even find in the first instance.
The CMS website provides a lengthy explanation of its
partnership with the states,192 but this is hardly comforting if
one lives in a state such as Texas, which has already sworn
to resist the ACA as much as possible.193 The mere presence
of this federal fall-back system, though, may serve a
deterrent function of some sort.194 However, by cutting off
information to consumers and declining to accept awards
that require the collection of consumer complaint
information, the anti-ACA states have lessened the
likelihood that any complaints will come to light, or that
consumers will even know that they have grounds for a
complaint.

189. Rosenbaum, supra note 104, at 181.
190. 45 C.F.R. § 150.209; Rosenbaum, supra note 104, at 181 (“[E]ven when
evidence of nonenforcement surfaces, the regulations throw the matter back into
the very state system whose allege failure is the subject of the third-party
evidence.”).
191. 45 C.F.R. §§ 150.211-221 (explaining the process of notice to state officials,
a thirty-day wait for a response with an option to extend the time to respond, an
initial determination and additional time for the state to show substantial
enforcement, and then a final determination as to whether CMS will intervene in
the process).
192. See, e.g., State Health Insurance Marketplaces, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/
state-marketplaces.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
193. See Letter from Rick Perry, Governor of Tex., to Kathleen Sebelius, U.S.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs. (July 9, 2012), available at http://gov.texas.gov/
files/press-office/O-SebeliusKathleen201207090024.pdf (“I stand proudly with
the growing chorus of governors who reject the PPACA power grab. Thank God
and our nation's founders that we have the right to do so.”); Rosenbaum, supra
note 104, at 182-83 (“If problems are uncovered, CMS notes that it will ‘work
cooperatively’ with the state (the same state that notified CMS that it would not
enforce the law) to ‘ensure compliance.’”).
194. Rosenbaum, supra note 104, at 183.
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One of the ACA’s foundational principles is that
informational transparency would aid consumers by
facilitating consumer understanding and enrollment, giving
consumers a chance to push back against unreasonable rate
reviews, and permitting precise enforcement of consumer
protections. Taken together, the rejections of consumer
information transparency provisions emerge as a campaign
potentially comparable in its effects to the rejection of the
Medicaid expansion, yet operating with little fanfare and
without the stakeholder resistance that the rejection of
Medicaid’s expansion has attracted.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE STATES’ ACA INFORMATION
BLOCKADE & POSSIBLE AMELIORATIONS
The ACA’s implementation is evolving, and its status
changes daily. The full effect of the states’ resistance to
consumer information provisions will not be known for years,
or even decades. Already, however, some implications of the
states’ consumer information blockade can be seen.
A. The Federal Fallback Undermined
In states declining to host exchanges, expand Medicaid,
and enforce market reforms, the federal fallback is crucial for
individuals to claim the ACA benefits to which they are
entitled.
ACA
provisions
involving
information
dissemination and transparency, such as those addressing
creation and promotion of exchanges, enforcement of market
reforms, and others, are among those with a federal fallback.
But in states where the federal fallback is necessary, citizens
are less receptive to the ACA (in part due to a lack of factually
correct information about the ACA)195 and to federal help,
thereby limiting the federal fallback’s effectiveness.
When the federal government takes over traditional
state functions such as the regulation of health insurance
and the enforcement of related consumer rights, the states
are effectively ceding this ground to the federal government
by allowing the federal fallback to apply, thereby permitting
195. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
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a soft federal takeover of those areas.196 But in the states that
resist the ACA by declining the Medicaid expansion and
refusing exchanges, how effective is this fallback likely to be?
Will the federal government be able to enter those fields and
overcome these states’ hostility to the ACA and federal
intervention?
The effectiveness of the federal fallback depends in part
on the willingness of citizens to accept the ACA and to turn
to the federal government instead of their state government
for help. State resistance to the ACA tends to follow along
party lines—the ACA is very unpopular with Republican
voters, who traditionally dislike large federal programs and
have greater faith in their state government.197 In polls,
Republicans held much more negative views than Democrats
of the ACA, and Republicans also hold more negative views
of the federal government itself.198 Significantly, when asked
about their confidence that an exchange program would
succeed, Republicans were much less confident about the
program when they were told the federal government would
implement it than they were when told the state government
would do so.199 Indeed, 79% of Republicans polled professed to
be “not too confident” or “not at all confident” that a health
insurance exchange would be successfully implemented if the
implementation
were
conducted
by
the
federal
government.200 That number dropped to 57% when the
program was described as being implemented by the states.201
Democrats, on the other hand, were more confident in the
196. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 72, at 587 (“At the same time,
however, in those states that opt out of the federal program, the federal
government steps in to take over what was often previously an area of state
dominion (for example, health insurance) and does so in a more subtle way than
taking over the entire system at once.”).
197. Bill Barrow, Obamacare Faces Near-Solid Block in the South, HUFFINGTON
POST
(Mar.
30,
2013,
3:53
PM)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/03/30/obamacare-block_n_2985587.html (quoting Republican pollster Whit
Ayers as describing the law as “toxic among Republican primary voters”).
198. DROPP ET AL., supra note 101.
199. Id. at 2.
200. Id. at 10, 11.
201. Id. at 11.
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exchange program when it was described as a federal
program—just 24% were not confident it would succeed, with
34% not confident that state implementation would
succeed.202 This lack of confidence can lead to further distrust
of the ACA and the federal government.203 That is,
Republicans have less faith in federal government to begin
with, so by placing the ACA in federal hands, the ACA is
undermined from the start and thus less likely to succeed,
further confirming the initial bias.204
In addition, the ACA’s framing in the public discourse
can affect people’s perception of the law and the choices that
they make.205 A recent Kaiser poll indicates that even in the
four Republican-dominated states studied, a clear majority of
individuals tend to believe that the government should be
responsible for providing health insurance for low-income
people.206 Yet about half the people polled in these states did
not know or denied that the ACA provides such help to lowincome people.207 Despite lacking this crucial piece of
information about the law, wide majorities polled in these

202. Id.
203. Id. at 17 (predicting “increased political polarization and distrust of the
federal government”).
204. See id. at 4; see also Jonathan Bernstein, 1. Undermine health care reform
2. Complain it doesn’t work, WASH. POST (June 28, 2013), http://www.washington
post.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2013/06/28/1-undermine-health-care-reform-2complain-it-doesnt-work.
205. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 458 (1981) (noting that “the susceptibility
of preferences to variations of framing raises doubt about the feasibility and
adequacy of the coherence criterion” that the authors had adopted).
206. Polls in Four Southern States, supra note 178, at 6. In Arkansas, 70% of
people surveyed said that the government at some level should provide health
insurance for low-income people; and in Kentucky, North Carolina, and
Louisiana, 74%, 74%, and 72%, respectively, of people polled said that
government was responsible. Id.
207. Id. at 4. In Arkansas, 52% did not know or denied that the ACA provides
financial help to low and moderate income Americans who don’t get insurance at
work to help them purchase coverage; in Kentucky, 45%; in Louisiana, 56%; and
in North Carolina, 48%. Id.
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states disapproved or strongly disapproved of the ACA. 208 In
the same vein, citizens of Medicaid non-expansion states
state that they favor Medicaid expansion and other key
individual elements of the law (when presented in a question
as a specific proposition and not as part of the ACA), even as
they profess disapproval of the law as a whole.209 This
approval of the law’s individual tenets together with
disapproval of the law as a whole (when called by its popular
name) suggests that opinions about the ACA are not based
on factually-correct features of the law but are based on other
factors.
The exact reasons for this disconnect are hard to pin
down precisely, but it may be no coincidence that these same
states have some of the highest per capita spending on antiACA advertising.210 In anti-ACA states, politicians’ rhetoric
and negative advertising have affected citizens’ views of the
ACA.211 According to some, the anti-ACA environment in the
anti-ACA states has led some to believe that the ACA has
been repealed.212 Social norms have been shown to influence
individuals’ perception of their choices and to influence
behavior in a number of different spheres.213
Thus, even though individuals in southern states
actually agree with many tenets of the ACA, the negative
information is crowding out the factually correct information,
208. Id. Arkansas, 62% disapproved or disapproved strongly of the ACA; in
Kentucky, 55%; in Louisiana, 59%; and in North Carolina, 54%. Id.
209. Michael Ollove, Despite Governors’ Opposition, Strong Southern Support
for Medicaid Expansion, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (May 21, 2013),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2013/05/21/
despite-governors-opposition-strong-southern-support-for-medicaid-expansion.
210. Niam Yaraghi, Have the Anti-Obamacare Ads Backfired?, BROOKINGS (July
9, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/techtank/posts/2014/07/9-anti-aca-adsbackfire (“The four states with the highest per capita spending on anti-ACA ads
are Kentucky, Arkansas, Louisiana, and North Carolina.”).
211. Galewitz, supra note 27.
212. Id. (“We run into people all the time who say, ‘I thought the law had been
repealed,’ because all they hear is their congressman has voted for the 50th time
to repeal the ACA.”).
213. See CASS SUNSTEIN & RICHARD THALER, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 34-35 (2009) (noting that people tend to
conform their behavior to what they perceive to a norm—behaviors studied
included college students’ drinking and tourists’ taking of petrified wood).
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such that the ACA emerges tainted and is not judged on a
factually correct basis.
B. Forgoing Benefits While Funding the Benefits of Others
The states that suppress the informational transparency
provisions of the ACA are condemning their citizens to fund
the healthcare of those in other states while being less likely
to claim their own benefits. Citizens of states that reject
informational transparency provisions lose out in multiple
ways, explained in turn below: (1) by being less likely to claim
their benefits while continuing to be subject to federal taxes
and the individual mandate’s penalty tax, which operate
without state implementation; (2) by losing federal funds
which would be spent of premium subsidies and cost sharing;
and (3) by receiving less value for their health insurance
dollar, because their states decline enforcement activities
that would strengthen consumer protections. Some, but not
all, of the repercussions of the anti-informationaltransparency stance are related to the lower ACA enrollment
that characterizes these states.214 States can reject certain
ACA provisions and avoid disseminating enrollment
information about the ACA, as described above, but the
revenue-raising portions of the ACA and the individual
mandate’s penalty tax remain applicable in these states,
independent of state implementation. In states rejecting the
ACA, then, the citizens lose money at several levels—at the
state level, when the state does not receive Medicaid monies,
214. States that have embraced the law by expanding Medicaid and creating
their own exchanges have seen their rate of uninsured individuals drop by an
average of 2.5%, from 16.1% uninsured to 13.6%, compared with a drop of 0.8%,
from 18.7% to 17.9% uninsured, in states implementing neither or just one of
these measures. Dan Witters, Uninsured Rate Drops More in States Embracing
Health Law, GALLUP (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/168539/
uninsured-rates-drop-states-embracing-health-law.aspx. In states supporting the
ACA with outreach and state-run exchanges, enrollment of the previously
uninsured has progressed apace. In California, for example, a state with 7 million
uninsured (the highest number in the country), more than 30% of those eligible
for marketplace plans had enrolled as of March 17, 2014. Galewitz, supra note 27.
In states openly hostile to the ACA, the situation is quite different. In Texas, a
state with 6.2 million uninsured, fewer than 10% of those eligible had enrolled as
of March 1, 2014. Id.
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and at the individual level, when a lack of outreach and
information results in fewer citizens’ obtaining health
insurance and thereby failing to receive the federal subsidies.
And, citizens who do not obtain health insurance are more
likely to be subject to the penalty tax.
As an initial matter, the non-expansion of Medicaid
results in a large shift in funds from non-expansion states to
expansion states.215 As explained above, however, the
Medicaid expansion opposition is softening for this and other
reasons. Medicaid expansion monies are, however, just part
of the monies that states rejecting the ACA and shutting
down related consumer information will lose.
In addition to the loss of Medicaid monies, these states,
due to their lower enrollment, will lose federal monies that
would have been spent on premium subsidies and cost
sharing.216 The premium subsidy and cost-sharing amounts
are significant—starting at $5290 per subsidized enrollee in
2014 and rising to $7900 in 2023.217 While a direct link
between resistance to informational transparency provisions
and lower enrollment is difficult to establish, the anti-ACA
states have taken aim at exactly the mechanisms that would
215. States’ decisions to expand Medicaid or not results in a large shift in federal
funds. One analysis finds that the 24 expanding states will received $30.3 billion
new federal dollars, while those rejecting expansion will forego $35.0 billion in
new federal dollars. Don Taylor, ACA: Self Imposed Redistribution from Poor to
Rich States, FREEFORALL (Oct. 26, 2013), http://donaldhtaylorjr.wordpress.com/
2013/10/26/self-imposed-redistribution-from-poor-to-rich-states/#comments.
216. Henry J. Aaron, States Engaging in Fiscal Madness, BROOKINGS (Mar. 18,
2014), http://brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/03/18-states-fiscal-madnessmedicaid-expansion-aaron (noting that non-expansion states such as Texas lose
not only the federal funds they would have received for Medicaid, but must still
subsidize the Medicaid expansion in other states by payment of federal taxes).
Rejection of the Medicaid expansion itself results in a loss of $9.2 billion to the
state of Texas by 2022. Id. The anti-ACA states are generally lower-income states
with greater numbers of poor and uninsured people, so this use of the law in this
way becomes regressive, disfavoring the poor and moving money to the richer
states.
217. “In total, CBO estimates that the federal government will spend $5290 per
subsidized enrollee in fiscal year 2014, rising to $7900 in fiscal year 2023. This
includes spending for premium tax subsidies; cost-sharing subsidies; and,
through 2014, related federal financial support to operate the exchanges.” James,
Premium Tax Credits, supra note 11, at 2.
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increase enrollment and help consumers obtain these
subsidies; navigators, for example, whom anti-ACA states
have burdened with additional requirements and
restrictions, are charged with explaining tax subsidies to
potential enrollees.218 By burdening navigators, the
seventeen Republican-led states that enacted such
regulations not only reduced the likelihood that their citizens
would enroll in health insurance plans but also that they
would learn about available federal tax credits. As explained
above, one of the most significant stated reasons for declining
to enroll in or even shop for health insurance is cost.219 And
yet, the majority remain unaware of the federal tax credits
for which they qualify.220 By interfering with the delivery of
information about such tax credits, the states are further
declining federal tax monies and discouraging citizens from
enrolling in health insurance plans. In declining to operate
consumer assistance centers set out in the ACA, states are
also adding to their citizens’ tax burden by failing to provide
help in obtaining premium credits on their taxes, as
consumer assistance centers are required by law to do.221
The individual mandate penalties will hit harder where
campaigns against health transparency have depressed
enrollment.222 Under the individual mandate, individuals
218. ACA § 1311(i)(3) (“An entity that serves as a navigator under a grant under
this subsection shall . . . distribute fair and impartial information concerning
enrollment in qualified health plans, and the availability of premium tax
credits. . . .”).
219. ENROLL AMERICA, THE UNINSURED MIDWAY THROUGH ACA OPEN
ENROLLMENT 3, 10 (2013), available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/assets.enroll
america.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Perry_Undem_Uninsured_Survey.pdf
(noting that 69% of people who were uninsured did not have insurance because
they could not afford it, yet 69% also did not know about available subsidies).
220. Id. at 2-5.
221. ACA § 2793(c)(5) (providing that the office of health insurance consumer
assistance shall “resolve problems with obtaining premium tax credits under
section 36B” of the Internal Revenue Code).
222. To encourage more Americans to carry health insurance, the ACA features
both individual and employer mandates. The mandates are tied to penalties for
failure to abide by the mandate, and these penalty payments help subsidize the
health insurance premiums of lower-income Americans. In addition, the
individual mandate discourages both the free rider problem and adverse
selection, in which those with greater health problems would tend to enroll, while
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must carry health insurance or face a penalty tax.223 The
individual mandate is the centerpiece of the ACA, as it is the
impetus for all individuals to ensure that they have
insurance. Certain groups are excluded from the mandate;224
these total about twenty-three million people who may not
have insurance even after the ACA is fully implemented.225
Large employers too are subject to a mandate, which requires
that they either make affordable health insurance available
or pay a penalty, starting in 2015.226 The individual mandate
those without health problems would forgo enrollment, reasoning that they could
enroll later without fear of being barred by pre-existing conditions. MCDONOUGH,
supra note 9 at 121 (noting that “[v]oluntary systems create a ‘free rider’ problem,
as some take advantage of services and benefits without contributing.”): Amy B.
Monahan, On Subsidies and Mandates: A Regulatory Critique of ACA,
36 J. CORP. L. 781, 787 (2011) (noting that “[t]o combat this likelihood of adverse
selection, the individual mandate seeks to get everyone, particularly healthy
individuals” covered by health insurance).
223. ACA § 5000A. The penalty tax will be $695 per year in 2016, or one-twelfth
of that amount for every month that the person fails to maintain minimal
essential coverage. Id. § 5000A(c). The Act further provides that the amount of
the penalty will increase each year after 2016 by a cost-of-living adjustment.
Id. § 5000A(c)(3)(D). Starting in 2014, the penalty tax is phased in, with $95 per
adult (up to $285 per family) or 1% of total income, whichever is greater. In 2015,
the flat fee is $325 per adult (up to $975 per family) or 2% of family income,
whichever is greater. Id. § 5000A(c).
224. Individuals are exempt from the penalty tax on the following bases: (1)
religious objection; (2) membership in a federally recognized Indian tribe or
eligibility for services through an Indian care provider; (3) income below the tax
filing threshold; (4) a gap in coverage of less than three months; (5) a hardship
resulting in inability to obtain coverage; (6) inability to afford health insurance
such that the minimum amount the person must pay for the premiums is more
than 8% of the person’s household income; (7) incarceration; or (8) status in the
United States other than U.S. citizen, U.S. national or alien lawfully in the United
States. Id. § 5000A(d)–(e).
225. MCDONOUGH, supra note 9, at 109-10.
226. In 2015 and after, large employers must pay a penalty if:
(a) The employer does not offer health coverage or offers coverage to
fewer than 95% of its full-time employees and the dependents of those
employees, and at least one of the full-time employees receives a
premium tax credit to help pay for coverage on a Marketplace; or (b) The
employer offers health coverage to all or at least 95% of its full-time
employees, but at least one full-time employee receives a premium tax
credit to help pay for coverage on a Marketplace, which may occur
because the employer did not offer coverage to that employee or because
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and its associated individual penalty tax were set up not as
revenue-raisers but as nudges to change behavior—namely,
to buy health insurance.227
But, particularly to people with lower incomes, the
penalty tax represents a significant amount of money and is
a regressive tax.228 While much of the ACA invites state
implementation, the penalty tax does not.229 It is filed with an
individual’s annual federal income tax statement.230

the coverage the employer offered that employee was either unaffordable
to the employee or did not provide minimum value.
Questions and Answers on Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions Under the
Affordable Care Act, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Questions-andAnswers-on-Employer-Shared-Responsibility-Provisions-Under-the-AffordableCare-Act#Liability (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
227. MCDONOUGH, supra note 9, at 256. Because the penalty does not fit any
known theory of taxation, commentators tend to view its main goal as affecting
purchasing decisions Monahan, supra note 222, at 794 (noting that “this type of
distribution does not fit within any known theories of the distribution of income
tax burden. If it is to survive rational analysis, it must be because of its impact
on purchasing decisions.”). Key revenue-raising sections in the ACA are set out
in Title IX. Amounts raised range from $2.7 billion over ten years, see ACA §
5000B, which imposes a tax on indoor tanning salons, to $210.2 billion over ten
years, see id.§ 9014, which broadens the Medicare hospital insurance tax base for
high-income taxpayers. The individual mandate’s penalty taxes are estimated to
raise $45 billion over ten years, a sum that is not insignificant, but which was not
the main purpose of the penalty. Rather, the penalty was intended to mitigate the
problem of adverse selection—if insurance companies are required to guarantee
the issue of health insurance to all comers, then people who are healthy could
decide to wait until they are ill to obtain health insurance. Jeffrey H. Kahn, The
Individual Mandate Tax Penalty, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 319, 332 (2014)
(“Congress enacted the individual mandate in an attempt to avoid the adverse
selection problem and nudge the healthy into the health insurance pools. The
mandate accomplishes this by tilting the balance heavily towards buying health
insurance for the vast majority of people.”).
228. The penalty tax is regressive in that individuals at the lower end of the
income scale pay the greatest percentage of income as a penalty if they do not
purchase health insurance. Monahan, supra note 222, at 793-94.
229. Morse, supra note 116.
230. Kahn, supra note 227, at 320. While non-payment of the penalty can be
offset against any refund that would otherwise be due, the penalty tax cannot
result in liens or criminal sanctions. ACA § 5000A(g)(2).
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When the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that states could opt
out of the Medicaid expansion,231 the Congressional Budget
Office increased its projection of the number of people who
would pay the penalty tax associated with being uninsured.232
The CBO projected that two million more people would pay
the penalty tax than if the states were required to expand
Medicaid.233 In addition, greater numbers of people will be
subject to the penalty tax due to the lower enrollment in the
states that have rejected Medicaid, refused to create
exchanges, and rejected consumer information transparency
provisions.
While the state governments may have legitimate
reasons for rejecting the approach to healthcare reform
represented by the ACA, the ACA is the law, such that even
citizens of anti-ACA states have legitimate benefits that they
should be able to access. Currently, citizens are extremely
confused about the ACA, and this confusion increases as
socioeconomic status and current access to health insurance
decline.234
Finally, when consumers lack access to information
about enforcement information—as is the case when the
states decline to provide consumer assistance or enforcement
of market reforms—and states, in turn, are not collecting
information about the issues consumers face, then consumers
231. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601-09 (2012).
232. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR BEING
UNINSURED UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2012), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/09-19-12-Indiv_
Mandate_Penalty.pdf.
233. Id. at 1. Of those projected to pay the penalty tax, 600,000 have incomes of
less than 100% of the federal poverty level, 1.2 million have incomes of between
100 and 200% of the federal poverty level, 1.2 million have incomes of between
200 and 300% of the federal poverty level, 1.1 million have incomes of less
between 300 and 400% of the federal poverty level, 600,000 have incomes of
between 400 and 500% of the federal poverty level, and 1.2 million have incomes
greater than 500% of the federal poverty level. Id.
234. As the 2013-14 open enrollment season approached, 59% of people overall
knew that the ACA was the law of the land and would be implemented, while that
number sank to 42% when only people with household incomes of less than
$30,000 per year were included. Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: April 2013, supra
note 27.
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are receiving less value for their health insurance and tax
dollars. That is, they are paying, albeit indirectly, for the
ACA’s provisions, but they do not receive the full value that
consumers in more enforcement-oriented states receive.
C. Rectifying the Information Gap
Diverse actors, including Congress, federal agencies,
state governments, and private health insurance companies,
will need to act in order to close the information gap.
Legislators at the federal level have long sought uniform
regulation in areas that might result in a race between the
states to the regulatory bottom in order to attract businesses
seeking relative freedom from regulation.235 These provisions
of the ACA are in danger of becoming just such an area,
where citizens are not protected unless more uniform laws
are put in place, or state governments move to ensure that
their citizens receive the equal benefits of this new law.
Nevertheless, broad Congressional action to promote the
ACA remains unlikely in the near term.
More modest steps, however, could include Congress
providing further funds to establish, continue, and promote
Consumer Assistance Centers. This would shore up a means
of assisting consumers with healthcare literacy, claims and
appeals processes, and the collection of information to further
enforcement of the ACA’s consumer protections. Without
235. The Clean Air Act is one such example. John P. Dwyer, The Practice of
Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1195 (1995)
(“Congress’s widely repeated justification for preempting less stringent state
ambient air quality standards and certain stationary source emission standards,
and for creating the mandatory PSD program, was the states’ natural tendency
to compete in a “race-to-the-bottom” for business. Because of their willingness to
relax environmental standards to attract or keep economic development, states
could not be trusted to adopt adequate standards.”). The credit card industry is
another example. When the Supreme Court permitted companies to use
nationwide the usury laws of their home states, the states competed to have the
least restrictive usury laws, with South Dakota, Delaware and others completely
doing away with ceilings on interest rates. MATTHEW SHERMAN, CTR. FOR ECON. &
POLICY RESEARCH, A SHORT HISTORY OF FINANCIAL DEREGULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES (2009), available at http://www.cepr.net/index.php/publications/reports/ashort-history-of-financial-deregulation-in-the-united-states (follow “PDF” link).
Credit card companies immediately moved their operations to these states. See
id.
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proper funding, this program cannot fulfill its potential, even
with regard to those states inclined to apply for such funds.
In addition, state navigator restrictions must be closely
watched to see if they, as implemented, prevent navigators
from carrying out their duties. In its most recent regulation,
HHS noted that it would monitor state laws regulating
navigators and potentially undermining navigators’
eligibility and ability to perform their intended function. 236
HHS has, at this time, declined to enumerate all the
potentially-harmful state laws and requirements but states
that it “has monitored, and will continue to monitor” nonfederal requirements imposed on navigators and other
assistance personnel.237
Significantly, however, those groups and lobbyists who
advocate for the expansion of Medicaid should also advocate
for greater information access so that citizens can access the
benefits to which they are entitled. Medicaid expansion is of
course a crucial means of expanding access to healthcare. But
apart from Medicaid expansion, many more Americans may
choose to access existing benefits if only more information
were available.
CONCLUSION
Reforming the American healthcare system of course
takes time.238 The ACA should be judged in terms of decades
rather than years.239 Some predict that over the next years
and decades, the ACA will in the end be fully implemented,
just as Medicaid, passed in 1965, was eventually
implemented in recalcitrant states such as Arizona, but not
until 1982.240 Perhaps, as with Medicaid, the ACA will simply

236. 45 C.F.R. § 155.210-215.
237. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Exchange and Insurance
Market Standards for 2015 and Beyond, 79 Fed. Reg. 30,240, 30,274 (2014) (to be
codified at scattered parts of 45 C.F.R.).
238. EMANUEL, supra note 98, at 291 (noting that reform of such a large
healthcare system cannot be done overnight or even in one or two years).
239. See id.
240. Rosenbaum, supra note 104, at 171 (urging a federal fall-back for the
Medicaid expansion).
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take time to grow in popularity and to be fully implemented
in all the states.
Much of the focus regarding the ACA’s implementation
has been on the refusal of certain states to expand Medicaid,
and rightly so. But the consumer information transparency
provisions are crucial too—consumers are confused by the
ACA and often put off by the negative information they have
heard originating from political sources. Misinformation
about the law is particularly acute among those with lower
incomes and, therefore, less access to health insurance—the
people who most need information about their rights under
the ACA.

